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CHAPTER

I

INTRODUCTION: DEFINING SUCCESS AND FAILURE

President Ronald Reagan's second term was

a

failure

because the communications staff, led by Patrick Buchanan,

promoted an agenda too conservative to maintain the

popularity of the president's policies with the American
people.

Though public opinion polls furnished the president

with high approval ratings during the third quarter of his
presidency, this personal popularity did not translate into

successful passage of legislation.

In fact,

Reagan

accomplished much more in terms of real policy during the
first term, a time when his approval ratings were depressed

by a poor economy.

Reagan's successful first term can be measured in
terms of the number of his proposals that passed through
Congress, his ability to lead the so-called "Reagan

Revolution,

"

and his influence on foreign policy.

legislative triumphs helped Reagan to forge

enduring popularity and to stake out

a

a

Early

base of

position of power,

which were imperative after campaigning in an election that
failed to enthuse voters.

Many voters also admitted to

pollsters that, even though they liked Reagan and had higher
regard for him than President Carter, they had trouble

accepting the new president's principal beliefs.

Reagan and

his first-term staff had to frame competently the major

campaign issues for public consumption and deftly deal with
Congress because winning entry to the White House is only
1

.

the first step in the policy- implementation
process.

Controlling the agenda, realizing domestic policy, and
fulfilling campaign promises could assure Reagan the

capacity to determine his own course of action in
Washington, D.C.
The 1980 election demonstrated that the country

remained disappointed in Carter's leadership from both an
economic and foreign policy standpoint.

Reagan presented an

economic plan that he assured voters would strengthen the

economy and end its inflationary tendencies under Carter.
Less significant to the Reagan victory, though indicating a

similar mood among voters, was the hostage crisis in Iran.
The plight of those in captivity made Carter a weaker

president and seemed to elevate Reagan's stature:
Those who win presidential elections
are those who fulfill the role
expectations of the American public.
And role expectations have very little
to do with political issues or
policies 1
As James David Barber, author of The Presidential Character

,

posits, a president enters the White House needing to

reassure voters, maintain themes of progress and action, and

provide

a

sense of legitimacy.

components of what Barber calls

These are the three
a

"climate of expectations."

"Besides the power mix in Washington, the President has to
deal with a national climate of expectations, the

predominant needs thrust up to him by the people.""

The

basic role expectation voters placed on Reagan, then, was to
make them better off (progress) and return their confidence

2

:

(legitimacy)

in American institutions.

But success for

Reagan, or any president, cannot be evaluated only
in terms
of what the public anticipates will be accomplished.

While

Reagan could renew the hopes of Americans by lifting them
from the poor economy and freeing the hostages, his position
as chief executive and party leader demanded that other

elements of his conservative philosophy come to fruition.

Shrinking the size of the federal government and its

entitlement programs while increasing the military'
were Reagan's major goals.

budget

Wilbur Edel, a liberal critic of

the administration, portrays most of Reagan'
a

s

s

first term as

failure because of the effects the president's policies

had on lower class citizens.

But this is not the set of

criteria on which either Reagan's successes or failures will
be appraised in this thesis.

The individual merits of

policies need not be judged except in terms of how they

helped or hindered the president from gaining power and
influence.

Therefore, the successes and failures examined

here will focus only on the abilities of Reagan and his

staffs to pass legislation and maintain high public support.
By maximizing his use of the media through public
appeals, Reagan greatly enhanced his standing as the most

important and powerful political figure in the United
States.

This strategy, however, did not guarantee immediate

success unless he had the cooperation of those in Congress
that he hoped to influence.

According to presidential

scholar Richard Neustadt

3

.

Because our monarch' s formal powers are
so largely shared, his personal
effectiveness (actual power) is in the
same degree at risk, dependent on
consent from other sharers
3

.

But,

in fact, most of Reagan's popular appeals
in the first

term could not be effectively blunted by his
opponents.
Many Democrats felt the pressure to side with the
president
and give him their consent.
House Democrats went along with

Reagan's agenda because they feared being defeated later at
the ballot box.

However, by the middle of the second term

these other "sharers" were more willing to resist the

president.

Their concerns about losing faded as the White

House became more ideological and less able to influence the

electorate
The second term, then, can be characterized as a

failure because Reagan was unable to advance policy despite
his large victory in the 1984 election.

The staff members

seemed to ignore the lack of passion Americans held for such
key domestic and foreign policies as financially supporting
the military efforts of the Contras,

reducing taxes, and building
system.

a

lowering the deficit,

space-based missile defense

While it is true many of these goals had some

public support (as they still do today)

,

it was incumbent

upon the president and his communications people to firm up
the popularity of these issues to overcome the more

determined House leadership and
the Senate that arrived in 1986.

a

new Democratic majority in
Thus it was possible that

Reagan's objectives might not be accomplished without

returning to a bargaining system with Congress.
4

In this paper

I

will examine how a new set of role

expectations, a decline in Reagan's personal abilities,
and
the institutional politics of the mid- 1980 's played
key
the failures Buchanan might have avoided.

5

•
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CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEW: WHERE DID THINGS GO WRONG?

Autobiographies by presidential staff members Michael
Deaver, Edwin Meese, Peggy Noonan, Donald Regan, and
Larry

Speakes contribute to the collective understanding of the

Reagan administration by discussing the successes and
failures during the periods of their employ.

However,

the

two key players in the communications effort, directors

David Gergen and Patrick Buchanan, have not yet written
accounts of their service.

This means that the going-public

strategies they implemented and their influence over policy
are best described by second-hand sources.

The personal histories written by Reagan staffers,

coupled with the analyses by political writers, agree that
the second term was less productive at passing policy, with

tax reform being the only major legislative success.
fact,

In

some of these writers make a convincing argument that

the first year of Reagan's eight in Washington marked his

greatest legislative achievements.

achievement is not

a

But legislative

complete measure of a president's

successes, especially during a second term.

It should be

remembered that presidents often struggle in second terms,
finding it harder to pass their programs and almost

impossible to match the good feelings of the first term.

After all, a successful first term is what allows

a

president to procure an additional term.
Poor second terms have dominated the presidencies of
the television age.

President Eisenhower faced a recession
7

.

s

.

from 1957 to 1959 and failed to take a stand
on the evolving
civil rights movement.
President Johnson, after
the

legislative triumphs of the Great Society program, became
deeply involved in the Vietnam War and had to deal with
social unrest on the homefront during his second term,

though it was the only term he served for which he was

elected on his own right.

President Nixon's agenda was

hampered by Watergate and the resignation of his vice
president
Reagan's conservative philosophy, though, appeared to
be different.

His resounding victory in the 1984

presidential election and the incomplete Reagan Revolution
seemed to assure that he would dominate the politics of the
mid-1980's.

But many of his ideas never came to fruition

and Congress began passing its own legislation once the

Senate returned to Democratic control in 1986.

How could

this happen to a president seemingly at the peak of his

power?

A good place to start is in the second term'

leadership

Reagan received much criticism throughout his

presidency for not controlling his staff, despite the fact
that he was in charge of all administration officials.

Meese claims this criticism was unfair and untrue.

But

after the Iran-Contra scandal, it became even easier to lay
blame on the president.
for hostages

-

The secret deals

-

swapping arms

the argument goes, would not have happened

under a responsible president who actually oversaw his
staff.

Reagan was wounded politically by the scandal.
8

:

Adding to the lack of presidential supervision,
White House
operations did not run as smoothly under Chief of
Staff
Donald Regan as they had under James Baker, Reagan's
first
chief of staff.
The organization of Reagan's staff was critical to his

presidency because the White House staff and members of the
Office of Communications fall under the control of both the

president and chief of staff.

But often the communications

director will report directly to the chief of staff,

bypassing any consultation with the president.

Regan was as

concerned as James Baker about retaining the president's
popularity, but Regan was also determined to implement the

conservative policies that he believed Baker had failed to
enact.

Yet Regan had far less ability and understanding of

how to develop policy, and he did not prepare an agenda for

Reagan until August 1985.

The action plan Regan drew up

would attack congressional spending, fight for tax reform,
encourage Reagan to use the veto, and have

a

series of

meetings with Mikhail Gorbachev.
The two major second-term staff changes took place at
the chief of staff position and at the communications

director post.
speechwriter

,

Peggy Noonan, Reagan's principal

scapegoats Regan, who she says was supposed to

be a White House leader and create policy for Buchanan to

make public.

Noonan quotes Michael Horowitz, counsel to the

Office of Management and Budget from 1981 to 1985, as
saying

9

.

[A] f ter four years the best
people were
tired.
And Regan came along, and he
was temperamentally unsuited and
unsuited in terms of experience
And
he had second-rate people around him
and a Cabinet older than the
1
.

Politburo

At the same time,

she eloquently defends Buchanan,

whom she had great respect and admiration.

a

man for

Buchanan could

not work in a Regan system which created paralysis.

But her

arguments for Buchanan do not always hold up because she is
reluctant to be critical of his work or his inability to
work in harmony with Regan.
Indeed, Regan and Buchanan clashed on the conservative

content of Reagan's 1985 State of the Union address.

provides
which,

a

Noonan

unique explanation for Buchanan's later failures,

she says, had nothing to do with making errors in

judgment.

She believes that the American people were no

longer listening to the president's words because they

already knew his policies and political views.

Buchanan had

to give up on his hope that Reagan would lead the

conservative revolution.
I guess my Pat Theory now is: He knew
that after six or seven years of a
Reagan presidency it didn't really
matter what words Reagan was saying,
because no matter what he said, people
were hearing the same thing. 2

So Reagan remained a dynamic speaker, but he was unable to

increase the appeal of his policies.

This is borne out in

the polls.

There is scant literature that describes the minutiae
of the work done by the Office of Communications, but

10

Buchanan's comments speak volumes about how he
intended to
use the office as a place for policy development.
While

the

office is closely monitored by the chief of staff,
the
office can, as Buchanan proved, be run independently from
the chief of staff's oversight and work in opposition to
his

desired goals.
Frequent attempts were made by Regan, Noonan says, to

separate words from policy.

This type of control was more

inhibiting than the "editorial board" approach used in the
first term.

"It was a constant struggle over speeches,

a

constant struggle over who was in charge and what view would

prevail and which group would triumph ."

3

This infighting

was even more damaging because the clarity of policy had

already been diminished by the lack of

a

clear-cut agenda.

The differences in these two men's political beliefs may not

have been vast, but they were sharply divided on the proper

approach to passing policy and the influence communications
officials should have.

Buchanan must be held accountable

for his reluctance to let Regan do the job of long-term

planning and overseeing the president's agenda.

11

.

Notes
Noonan, Peggy.
What I Saw at the Revolution- a
tlCal l£e in the Reaqan Era
New York: Random House,
?QQn
o^
1990 p 214
n

.

,

2.

Ibid,

p.

213.

3.

Ibid,

p.

72.
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CHAPTER III

REAGAN'S CHOICE: GO PUBLIC OR BARGAIN
A.

Explaining the Strategies

Public communication has become an important
source of
presidential power.
Presidents who effectively appeal both
to the American people and to the media are apt to
be more

successful in making policy.

Even those presidents who

refuse to use the highest office as
a

a

"bully pulpit" are in

position of strength every time they make a speech, hold

news conference, or appear in the presence of cameras.

a

This

fact is not lost on the chief of staff or the communications

director, both of whom have a great interest in making

decisions about the president's communications.
A modern president can choose from two approaches to
pass through Congress the issues on which he based his
campaign.

The more common in recent years has been the

"going public" strategy, which uses the combined skills of
the president and his communications staff to directly

address the American people.

The "going public" strategy is

an attempt to get people to support policies at the core of
the presidential agenda:

"A president must not only follow

public opinion but most often attempt to lead and generate
public support for

a

wide range of policy positions

."

1

Hence the president's need for this communications approach
in the modern era.

The other method,

frequently used in the past, is to

deal with legislators behind closed doors.

While bargaining

is a more time-consuming and demanding process that may
13

s

.

require twisting arms and compromising political
beliefs, it
can often yield better, more consistent
results for a
president.

Though the Reagan administration used both

strategies, especially in the first year, the president

eventually proved more adept at going public.

Thus he

sacrificed much of his original flexibility, concentrating
on defeating Congress in the public opinion arena.

time he took office,

From the

it was evident that the former

Hollywood actor was a better communicator than many of his
predecessors.

Not all politicians, and indeed not all

presidents, have been endowed with Reagan's ability to

communicate easily with the public.

But his communicating

skill may have created a lackadaisical attitude conducive to
the atmosphere for his second-term failings.

Hiring staff members trained in public relations is
essential for any modern president, especially one as

concerned about his daily appearances as Reagan was:
Reagan's staff, as media professionals,
recognized that the public has less and
less of a historical memory.
This
requires a daily concern rather than a
long-term perspective for impression
management 2
.

The strategy of going public hinges on rhetorical appeals by
the president and a reliable public-relations effort.

This

has resulted in an increase in the communications director'

influence
Selling policies to the American people, controlling
the legislative agenda and bureaucracy, and remaining

popular with the electorate are all part of going public.
14

.

This may or may not be a lethal combination
for

a

president's opponents:
When the people are behind him, he can
prevail against any of the lesser
publics - the pressure groups with
their lobbyists and their Congressional
spokesmen who dare oppose him 3
.

To fulfill his goal of overcoming opposition by using
the

passions of the public, Reagan assembled the largest
communications unit in White House history.
appeals reguired numerous speechwriters

specific expertise in

,

His direct

selected for their

policy area, their political views,

a

or simply their ability to write well.

The writers' prose

could elevate a policy argument from mere rational discourse
to passionate and persuasive speech.

Reagan's agenda, which

included rolling back entitlements and other domestic
programs,

lowering taxes, and increasing defense spending,

could have been passed without

a

large communications staff,

but the task would have been more daunting.

His eventual

dependence on the communications staff, as well as on the

Legislative Strategy Group, would hurt him later when the
communications director and chief of staff did not see eye
to eye

With the existing conflict between Regan and Buchanan
and the signs of strong support for Reagan in the polls,

traditional bargaining

-

the give and take between the White

House and Congressional actors

-

did not seem as if it would

be needed or be able to serve a purpose.

But Reagan, who

was so successful at the going-public tactic during the

first term, was unable to marshal support despite using the
15

same appeals again.

The personal popularity of a president,

apparently, will not always transcend unpopular
policy.
This is especially so if people are already
content, as many
people were by 1985.

Though the constantly expanding reach of the

electronic media has furnished other politicians with

opportunities to take center stage at the national level, in
the 1980's the president, despite his conservative beliefs,

had most of the advantages.

Being a Republican in

Washington has often meant fearing
Congress

,

a

hostile press and

which may have prompted the Reagan administration

to seek a role model of Republican success.

The Reagan

administration's communications efforts and promotional
techniques in time came to resemble those first employed by
President Richard Nixon.

When Reagan's first term began,

however, there was no indication that the communications

efforts would be closely patterned after Nixon's, despite
the fact that Reagan was succeeding a president who failed
to address his communications problems or to respond to the

"malaise" he saw.

Though the Reagan presidency did not

begin with a strong Office of Communications, his first four
years witnessed a skillful use of the office that was

return to the office's original intention.

a

Reagan

successfully "copied the Nixon practice of a tightly
regimented line-of -the-day coupled with limited press access
and direct appeals to the people."

4

instrumental in making this happen.

16

David Gergen was

.

But unlike Nixon, Reagan and his staff
did not

casually assault the press when they felt its
members were
biased against them. Reagan employed a press
secretary who
tried to be as open and cooperative as possible
because

managing the news and controlling its content required
that
the press be the administration's ally.

This lack of

friction freed the administration to concentrate on policy

development and to ensure that both Cabinet and

communications officials were pursuing

a

unified political

agenda

IL

History of the Office of Communications

The Office of Communications, added to the Executive

Office of the White House in 1969, has become instrumental
in the process of passing domestic policy through Congress.

Created by Nixon, the office was intended as

a

way to

maintain the successes realized on the presidential campaign
trail.

5

In Spin Control

,

John Anthony Maltese describes

the changes made during the Reagan years that were tied to
the president's expanded going-public strategies.

Public promotion of the presidency is mostly a

twentieth century phenomenon that matured when television
became the dominant medium.

After the first Kennedy-Nixon

debate in 1960, the American public's reactions confirmed
the powerful role television could play in influencing

opinions.

Nuances visible on the television screen

as facial expressions,

attire, and make-up

observed by those listening on radio.
17

-

-

such

could not be

This caused a

:

difference

m

opinion as to who won the debate, depending on
whether the person had watched or listened. Prior
to

Kennedy's use of this evolving technology, public
promotion
was not as powerful a tool.
President Woodrow Wilson,
for

example, tried to use public-relations techniques to
promote
the League of Nations.

His efforts failed, however, when he

was unable to garner enough support from the Senate to

ratify the treaty and allow the United States to join.

Some

critics blame his use of public relations for the failure

because it was an effort to manipulate the legislature.
Forty years of advances in television technology gave

Kennedy the impetus to have his press conferences, which
revealed his youthfulness and energy, carried live to the
nation.

He also established ties with media outside of

Washington by granting numerous interviews with hometown
newspapers and local television stations.

But public

relations at the presidential level was still in its

infancy
Before Nixon, most coordination of
public relations activities were
carried out in an ad hoc manner or were
Since then, the
simply left to chance.
Office of Communications has become an
indispensable part of planning and
implementing the strategies of the
modern public presidency
6

.

As promotional ideas acquired a more sophisticated form, the

policy-making process became more complicated.

This in turn

signalled the need for public-relations gimmickry, or the
advance of style over substance.

Reagan perfected this by

tapping into the short -attention spans of Americans.

18

But

this is a shallow analysis which does not
give the public
enough credit for separating sound policy from
an

influential communicator.

"The result has been great

emphasis on television-acceptable personalities for

candidates at all levels." 7

This represents a problem for

the American people only if they are reluctant to listen
to
all arguments about an issue.

Good policy is still

achievable even in an era dominated by sound bites.
The increased use of rhetoric and the greater number
of those involved in presidential communications operations

occurred at virtually the same time as the presidential
campaign season expanded.
essential to capture

a

As winning primaries became

party's nomination, candidates had to

make more direct appeals to the general electorate.

Indeed,

"How the public sees a candidate's personal qualities may

play a large part in winning or losing elections."

8

Candidates no longer had to make deals in the smoke-filled
back rooms of party headquarters, but instead had to broaden
their acceptability to more than the most dedicated party
members.
a

Yet while television's prominence gave candidates

greater ability to communicate on the national level, the

intimacy with the audience was lost.
As Reagan entered office in 1981, the White House was

still the dominant player in the president ial - legislative

relationship, despite the impact of Watergate.

The Office

of Communications, which went virtually unaffected by

Watergate, helped to make

a

White House-centered system of

19

government possible and expanded the range of what
the staff
could accomplish:
The Office of Communications had the
potential to be a particularly
effective tool of presidential power
since it could be used to increase the
president's internal as well as
external control over the policy-making
process
9

.

By formally combining all communications, the use of the

media could be maximized to mold public opinion and
highlight support for administration programs.

The Office

of Communications was to continue activities already being

performed by the overburdened press secretary, such as
advertising the administration'

s

viewpoint and preparing a

long-range plan for success in dealing with the media.
While other presidents had understood the need to use media
for promotional purposes, Nixon's appointment of personal

friend Herbert Klein to the post was
capture the media.

a

direct attempt to

"Klein's management of television and his

links with local media would serve to institutionalize a

means of going public

."

10

Henceforth, presidents would

have at their disposal another option in the policy

development process.
Media commentators at the time saw the communications
office as being no more than an ideological tool to advocate
the administration's policies.

Author Joe McGinnis referred

to the office's creation as a political move by Nixon to

ready his policies for sale to the American people.

The

major concern about the office was the potential that "the

packaging of policies for public consumption may become more
20

important than the policies themselves." 11

Constructive

and useful policy could be sacrificed solely to
procure

public acceptance.
The function of external communications, at its most
basic,

is to get the word out to the public.

The press

secretary, overseeing the Press Office, sends out the daily

information the president's advisers want reported in the

nation's major newspapers and viewed on the network news.
Press conferences are a viable method to inform the media on
a wide

variety of subject matter on

a

daily basis.

Long-

range planning is conducted under the auspices of the Office
of Communications.

The Office of Communications under

Reagan was responsible for pursuing three goals that made it
distinct from the Press Office:
long-term public relations planning,
the dissemination of the line-of - theday' to officials throughout the
executive branch, and the circumvention
of the White House press corps through
the orchestration of direct appeals to
the people. 12
'

Reagan performed this last element by opting to have few
press conferences and by bringing his unfiltered arguments

directly to the American people.

In the first term,

Reagan

held only 26 press conferences. 13
The basic difference between the independent offices
is best summed up by Maltese:

"the Press Office is primarily

reactive, the Office of Communications is primarily

proactive." 14

Promoting the president's agenda, scripting

his speeches, and defining his policies have historically

been the communications unit's primary functions:
21

"Whereas

the Press Office was responsible for dealing
with reporters'

daily concerns, the Office of Communications
was charged
with mapping a long-range media strategy." 15 The
process
of developing and advancing policy was modified
once faceto-fsce bargaining with Congress was downgraded.

As the

ability to circumvent Congress grew, there was less need to
have mutually acceptable policy.
This is an emphatic departure from the political

lessons learned from earlier scholarship on the relationship

between Congress and the president.
influential Presidential Power

,

a

In Richard Neustadt's

study first published in

1960 that examined the relationship between the two bodies,

the power to bargain is referred to as the most significant

presidential tool.

But in later editions Neustadt

acknowledged that he had not correctly forecast presidential
dependence on their staffs that began with Kennedy.

This

changed the dynamics of the relationship between the

president and the legislature because the president became

a

direct representative of the people, though he was not

necessarily blessed with

a

mandate.

Even with this

analysis, Neustadt could probably not have foreseen a

president such as Reagan who remained distant from Congress,
rarely bargained with its members, and still succeeded, for
a period,

in Washington.

C.

Chancres Made bv Reagan

Selling policy became the task of the Office of

Communications because the first administration relied on
22

a

combination of public pressure and bargaining to
influence
Congress.
But the Office of Communications both helped
and

hindered Reagan's ability to craft policy initiatives.
1981,

In

the office's strategies of appealing to the people

worked well.

ABC News polls that April suggested Reagan's

tactics were succeeding: 64 percent supported the

president

s

proposed spending cuts and 67 percent favored

his tax cuts.

16

These numbers came despite concerns that

cuts to entitlement programs might be forthcoming.

As the

alternative to bargaining, however, Reagan used the goingpublic strategy almost exclusively after the first year.
Going public was

a

natural fit for Reagan.

His public

speaking skills were always top-notch when speeches were

prepared for him.

Reagan's comfort in front of the camera

made it a simple decision for his advisers to schedule

staged television events.

method to employ on

a

This can, however, be a dangerous

regular basis, because it expands the

staff's workload and might be used for the most trivial
items on the agenda.

"

[T]

he commitment to speak precedes

the knowledge of any issue to speak about, often causing

staff to find or create an issue for the speech." 17

Even

when significant policy did not exist, communications

officials ensured that Reagan continued to speak at myriad
functions.

This only became a bigger problem with the

second term's unpopular agenda.
The status of Reagan's presidency from 1984 to 1988
was,

in large part,

determined by Buchanan's office and its

antagonistic relationship with Regan.
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Buchanan pushed the

communications office into uncharted territory by trying
to
brand his conservatism on policy. But Buchanan and
Regan
shared a common aversion to bargaining, since they believed
the first administration had too often compromised Reagan's

original goals.

Whether or not his 1980 campaign promises were indeed
compromised, Reagan's was a presidency whose successes and

failures were directly linked to how well the communications
were working.

The eight years Reagan spent in Washington

expanded the use of televised public appeals to an

unprecedented level.

Reagan's access to television, despite

his disdain for press conferences, was the most substantial
of any modern president.

And he is appropriately credited

with being the first president to use all available publicrelations resources.

As The New York Times writer Hedrick

Smith observed:
Nixon knew what Reagan proved: the
enormous power of television in the
hands of a skillful president.
Reagan
was the first president of the
television age to turn the power of
media leadership into the enactment of
his program. 18

Reagan's love for the job was genuine so persuading the
public was his forte.

The presidency was just another

acting role perfectly suited to his talents.

In addition,

Reagan seemed to enjoy the spotlight that the president's
involvement in world affairs gave him.
place for men of politics.
for every politician." 19

"The Presidency is a

But by no means is it a place

Reagan was naturally endowed with

the skill to use rhetoric and tell a good story.
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During his

first four years in the White House, Reagan
was referred to

alternately as "the Great Communicator" and the
"teflon"
president, the latter a term originated by liberal
representative Patricia Schroeder, D-Colorado, for his
remarkable ability to deflect controversy and criticism.

Reagan was such

a

likable politician that he probably could

have handled much of his own imagemaking.

Reagan

s

drive and ambition, coupled with the pleasure

he got from the job, may have helped him to remain

comfortable in Washington's often hostile climate.

personality of

a

The

president can have an effect on policy

outcomes, according to Neustadt

.

Reagan's governing style

took after his own demeanor, but his speeches contained

point -by-point analyses:

Rather than the substance of detailed
scrutiny and negotiations, policy
questions become overly simplified and
stylized to satisfy the cognitive
requirements of a largely inattentive
national audience 20
.

Gergen modelled his communications work after Klein,
remembering to remain as politically independent as the post
allowed.
the media.

Klein urged the departments to make greater use of
For instance, a "surrogates" program was

designed for use during the election years that saw local
officials friendly to the administration speaking on behalf
of the president's policy.

Klein also cultivated

congressional groups that would stand behind the president
on key domestic policy issues, saving precious time when the

bargaining process was required.
25

Going public is often a limited endeavor.

The work

needed to promote an issue will depend on the
importance it
has in the administration's agenda,

its viability with the

American people, and its chance of succeeding in
Congress.

hostile

"Obviously, mobilization of public support is

much easier when revolved around
symbol." 21

a

a

potent political

Such a symbol could be in the guise of a

national security concern or a fundamental need for the

long-term health of the country.

But political issues that

are this pressing will rarely require the use of

communications experts.

Reagan's 1981 budget was an

important issue that required careful, coordinated planning.
As noted above, good policy does not necessarily have to be

popular with the American people.

Going public, though, is

an attempt to raise the level of its popularity.

The "primetime" presidency makes support for tax

increases or cuts in social programs more palatable, but it
can also change the rhetoric:

"Public opinion is more

important than political persuasion... Presidential

leadership today is charismatic rather than

programmatic." 22

But policies are still important to a

president's success in the office and the maintenance of
coalitions.

"Skills of public performance are more

important than the skills of management." 23
of voters,

The attitudes

however, will require that a president achieve

his policy if he has any hopes of remaining popular.

Nevertheless, there are some political costs that must
be weighed.

Public appeals often weaken a president and can
26

t

.

.

impair the relationship between the legislative bodies
and
chief executive designed by the Founders. The ability

to go

public may give the president

a

influence.

Madison writes:

In Federal i s

50,

greater chance to gain

It may be contended, perhaps, that
instead of occasional appeals to the

people, which are liable to the
objections urged against them,
periodical appeals are the proper and
adequate means of preventing and
correcting infractions of the

Constitution

24

Some scholars, however, believe the use of public appeals

weakens the American political institutions by damaging the

relationship of checks and balances.

"The continual

attempts to mobilize the public through the use of personal
or charismatic power delegit imizes constitutional or normal

authority." 25

Ironically, however, problems can arise in a

presidency like Reagan's which was so dependent on public
communication
Making the choice between bargaining and going public
often appears to be easy, but perhaps presidents should give
it more thought:

The built-in conflict between the
President and Congress, assured by
checks and balances, leaves the
President dependent upon broad public
support as his most powerful means of
bending Congress to his will.
Fortunately, with the stakes so high,
the Presidential office is endowed with
superior opportunities for reaching the
public 26
.

Reagan was not similar to past presidents who had enjoyed

bargaining with Congress and could often succeed doing it.
Because the Republican party did not control the House of
27

Representatives, Reagan's advisers understood that public

communications had to be successful to go over the heads of
congressional leaders.

This helped in weakening the

resistance put up in the first term:
also in awe of Reagan'

s

"Many in Congress were

mastery of television and seeming

domination of the media." 27

Former Merrill Lynch employee

Henkel, who replaced Deaver as the chief advance man
for Reagan,

told one writer:

"We are marketing;

we are

trying to mold public opinion by marketing strategies.
That's what communications is all about." 28

This is "going

public" in its most elementary form.

Congressional resistance to approving more of Reagan's
agenda in the second term was not wholly unexpected

considering the inferior status the legislative branch had

willingly taken during the first term.

Democrats studied

the polls and saw through Reagan's high approval ratings to

the people's discontent with his agenda, which was confirmed

by the results of the 1986 mid-term elections.

Reagan's

reliance on the attitudes of the people meant he had no

Congressional liaison on which to fall back, which could
have paved the way for

a

better second term.

28
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CHAPTER IV
FIRST TERM

Before we can understand the failures of the second
term,

it is important to examine the first term to see how

the administration worked well and avoided controversy, even

though it was argued by some that the scope of the agenda
was deliberately limited.

A.

Winning the Election

Reagan had proved to be an able campaigner when he ran
against President Gerald Ford in the 1976 primaries.

His

success in that campaign assured him frontrunner status

among Republicans vying for the White House in 1980.

After

winning the 1980 primaries, Reagan was fortunate that the
campaign's rhetoric and debates with his opponents were

dominated by domestic policy.

Economic issues,

for

instance, can directly affect the daily lives of the

American public by changing spending habits and the quality
of life.

Reagan downplayed the social issues, a weak area

for him, and turned his concentration to the economy.

The

reasons for moving to economic issues were obvious: Reagan
had a huge advantage in public opinion over Carter on the

economy and on such intangibles as leadership, decisiveness,
and conviction.

Carter had an edge on the social issues,

which included his support for abortion rights and the Equal
Rights Amendment.

Both candidates understood that the campaign was

unlikely to be won on foreign affairs.
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Foreign policy has

.

often been conducted in

a

similar manner no matter who

resides in the White House:

"

[C]

ompared with foreign and

economic affairs, there has been much less coherence over
the years in the way in which government policy has been

made and carried out in domestic affairs."

1

Foreign policy

is also an area where presidents have more flexibility in

making demands on Congress because legislators are unlikely
to have as much knowledge on specific policy.

portrayed Reagan as

a

Carter

war monger, but it had little effect

on how voters cast their votes.

Eight polls, conducted

separately by CBS News/ The New York Times and NBC

News/Associated Press, found that between 29 and 32 percent
of the public believed Reagan would start a war if elected

president 2

;

yet Reagan won.

The candidate's victories in his own party's primaries

and then the presidential election furnished him with

momentum as he prepared to enter the Oval Office.

But

Reagan understood that he, like all other incoming
presidents of the modern era, faced high public
The demands placed on presidents have

expectations.

increased in union with the greater media exposure for all
politicians:

"

[C]

ontemporary growth in public expectations

of the presidency seem directly related to the growth of

mass media."

3

Reagan hoped to turn the expansive mass

media to his own advantage and meet the public expectations

promptly
By winning the presidential election, the candidate
has proved that he is a successful campaigner.
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But this is

often not enough to guarantee his success as
"As an occupant of a political office,

a

a

politician.

president must

possess and exercise traditional politician's skills of

communication and persuasion." 4

The length of modern

campaigns does help the president to hone some of the

communication skills he will need in the White House.

It

does not necessarily follow from his victory, though, that
he will have the ability to use popular rhetoric to promote

the office and gain legislative success.

Controlling Congress and the legislative agenda is

demand placed upon all incoming presidents.
mandate from the people or holding

a

a

Having a

majority in the

Congress can make it an easier task to make the campaigntrail promises reality.

But even a president who has

support from the people and who owns majorities in the House
and Senate does not necessarily pass legislation without

struggles and bargaining.

Reagan entered office appearing as inflexible with his
demands as any recent president even though his coalition

looked fragile.

There was also no mandate from the

electorate to pursue conservative policies.

So despite

Reagan's victory against an incumbent, it seemed unlikely
that he would be able to succeed in Washington without

working side by side with Congress.

According to James

David Barber, Americans in the 1980 election voted against
the ineffective Jimmy Carter rather than for the

conservative Ronald Reagan.

5

The election,

in which Reagan

won 489 of the 538 electoral votes, did witness the lowest
33

voter turnout in 32 years, as only 86 million
voters, or 54
percent of the eligible electorate, cast ballots.
The

voters who did vote, however, were giving Reagan

a

chance to

re-instill confidence in the presidency.
Reagan's task was made more difficult with the era of

divided government well in place.

Though his party held a

53-47 advantage in the Senate after the 1980 elections, a

majority they would hold until 1986, Reagan, like his most
recent Republican predecessors, faced a House of

Representatives with 243 Democrats and just 192 Republicans.
The combination of the low turnout and the House Democrat

majority seemed to ensure that Reagan's congressional
opponents would stand against him to hamper his conservative
vision.

But this did not happen,

Instead,

the president improved his power position by

at least not immediately.

convincing Congress that he, like other elected officials,
received a clear mandate from the public.
Broad themes were outlined by Reagan early in his 1980

campaign and further developed during the transition period
in sessions conducted under the auspices of the Legislative

Strategy Group (LSG)

.

This pre - inaugural preparation work,

coupled with Reagan's well-known political positions,
allowed his staff to mold policy that he would support and
later eloquently defend.
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IL
1.

Staffing the White Hourp

Finding Leadership
In the formal system that Reagan employed,

translating

the electoral victory into a productive presidency
was the

responsibility of the presidential advisers.

Reagan would

depend on a strong chief of staff to initiate the decision
process.

A president employing this management style has

the advantage of spending less time deciding which policy to

pursue and can give closer attention to
issues.

a

greater set of

The major liabilities of using this management

style were Reagan's lack of interest in following the

development of policy and his refusal to monitor his staff.
"The credibility of Reagan's policies was shaken by the

credibility of his insistence not to know what they were."

6

And there was potential that Reagan could receive distorted
information which would allow staff members to develop

policy on their own.
Any concerns about Reagan's management style were
alleviated by the people he put in charge of his first term.

After the 1980 election, Michael Deaver conspired with James
Baker to prevent Edwin Meese, Reagan's campaign manager,
from becoming the chief of staff.

While Baker had

experience as George Bush's campaign manager, Meese was

considered Reagan's closest friend from his days serving the
California governor.

Instead of choosing his friend,

however, Reagan was persuaded to put the more moderate Baker
in the top position.

The president then named Deaver his

deputy chief of staff and Meese his personal counselor.
35

.

White House operations would be run by this
so-called
"troika," a three-headed position peculiar to the
Reagan

administration
Meese had hoped to use the chief -of -staff position to
set Reagan's agenda, but he had to be content with oversight
of the National Security and Domestic Council staffs,

which

gave the conservative little real power over policy.

Decisions made by the troika were determined by majority
votes, with Baker and Deaver often teaming up on the

counselor to the president.

While it is often best for

conflict to remain outside the White House, the troika

encouraged frictions:
The system was built on mutual distrust
and, although no one said so, on the
premise of an impressionable president
vulnerable to whatever argument he
heard last
7

.

Fortunately for Reagan, Baker would maintain unity at the
highest levels of policy planning, something that his
successor, Donald Regan, found hard to do.

With the notable exception of Meese, who eventually

accepted his position as counselor to the president, the
staff was superbly unified in its goals during the first
term.

This helped guide the administration through periods

of personal conflicts.

The public agenda set forth by an

administration, Baker realized, must be adhered to by all

members of the president's team, including the high-level
staff,

cabinet officers, and other executive branch

officials.

This has the dual purpose of promoting

36

cooperation and preventing the administration from losing
focus on its predetermined goals.
The organization of the upper-level staff determined
the political direction of the first term.

Baker stayed the

moderate course by preventing Meese's ideas from gaining
acceptance in the White House.

Meese,

for example, wanted

the president to have multiple press secretaries, which

could have permitted him and other conservatives to become

equally prominent administration spokesmen.

Baker, however,

wanted only one press secretary, so he denied Meese's
request, entrusting James Brady with the power of the

highest - ranking communications official.
Conflicts that normally arise among staff members were
kept to a minimum in the early Reagan years.

Meese's anger

was pacified by his control over the Cabinet councils.

"The

clarity of the Reagan domestic agenda is what maintained so

much unanimity among key administration players; he never
had a loyalty problem with his Cabinet."

8

Baker and Deaver

helped to protect Reagan's policies, which had been in the
public domain for more than 20 years, from getting stale,

polish his agenda, and smooth its rough edges for public
consumption.

In doing so,

however,

conservatives felt,

whether correct or not, that the White House leadership had
changed Reagan's original mission.
While using public-relations techniques is important
to advance policy, most presidents have understood that a

two-pronged communications strategy is necessary in order to
be a successful president:
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To maintain control of the public
agenda, then, the White House must not
only minimize exposure of internal
conflict but also aggressively promote
the messages that it wants conveyed to
the American people 9
.

Baker could feel comfortable setting the agenda because

Reagan nearly always approved the consensus on policy

achieved in the Cabinet council meetings or through the
LSG's work.

"Once agreement was achieved, he seemed to

accept whatever decision was reached as his own, and he

expected all parties to adopt the 'team' position." 10

Quality policy, Reagan believed, did not depend on the
number of options available to him, but rather the caliber
of those hired to do the job.

In 1981,

policy experts

helped him to avoid choosing between competing policies in
formulating the budget.

This made it hard for Office of

Management and Budget Chairman David Stockman to convince
Reagan that he knew what was best for the Department of
Defense's budget when Reagan assumed Caspar Weinberger

-

nicknamed "Cap the Knife" for his previous budget cutting
prowess

-

could handle the job of determining his

department's budget.
In a divided government,

administration to present
Congress.

a

it is pivotal for the

unified front to influence

This is what Stockman tried to bring to the
"Good interpersonal communication skills

negotiating table.

will result in smoother staff operations, a better touch

with reality, and

a

more loyal staff." 11

The process by

which policy was formulated in this first year shows how
38

.

control was exerted from the top of Reagan's
chain of
command
This went against the traditional and more common
view
of the president's role in policymaking, summarized
by
Koenig:

"The President prepares for decisions by absorbing

oral briefings and reading and pondering memoranda

."

12

Even when he examined policy, Reagan only read summaries of
what was being developed for him, usually put together by

advocates of the policy.

This worked fine during the first

term because Reagan had capable staff members.

But when the

competence of the staff declined in the second term, the

corresponding level of trust he placed in their work did
not.

So the great passion Reagan held for his policies,

useful in communication, could often act as
sword.

a

double-edged

Once Reagan came to believe in a proposal it was,

staff members later admitted, difficult to make him change
his mind.
At the beginning of the first term, the Press

Secretary's office was expected to be instrumental in the

public-relations work of the administration.
and

Kama

Larry Speakes

Small were named Brady's deputy press secretaries,

but their roles were limited in scope and less public.

The

formal structure had Brady reporting to Baker through Staff

Director David Gergen, and speechwriters reporting directly
to Gergen.

The Office of Communications run by Frank

Ursamaro, however, began as an inferior entity.

Long-term

planning was instead conducted by the combined talents of
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Gergen, Deaver, Ursamaro, presidential pollster
Richard

Wirthlin, and Staff Secretary Richard Darman.
The more instantaneous political needs,

such as the

line-of -the-day, were effectively created in meetings

involving only upper-level staff.

They designed their daily

schedule so that the president's agenda would be the first

released to the public.
breakfast at 7:30 a.m.

The troika would meet for a working

By 8:15 a.m., the line-of -the-day

would be set and the information would be passed on to

Gergen and Speakes

.

Thirty minutes later, the president

would learn about the day's agenda.

Reagan evidently did

not care that he was not setting his daily agenda.

He

already had staff intelligently refining his broader themes.
This trust always had the potential to lead to

unsatisfactory results, but Baker's team usually did not
disappoint the chief executive.
The agenda was set in motion at Speakes'

9:15 a.m.

press briefing, giving the White House the lead on competing
agencies and taking away any chance that the president would
not be the day's policy- setter

.

Baker's efforts were

reinforced by his desire to have both internal and external
unity.

"Far more than earlier administrations, the Reagan

White House sought to impose tight discipline on other
agencies." 13

To further Baker's control,

the White House

press office instituted daily conference calls with the
press secretaries from other executive agencies that

requested them to conform to the president's agenda.

This

type of discipline would have been hard to imagine in the
40

Carter White House.

The line-of - the-day was then further

disseminated through Gergen and Speakes during the course
of
their day's work.
Independent from Gergen'

s

control was the

Congressional Relations Office run by chief congressional
lobbyist Max Friedersdorf

.

According to Reagan domestic and

economic policy adviser Martin Anderson, Friedersdorf was

highly regarded by Senators and congressmen from both
parties.

Kenneth Duberstein, Friedersdorf

'

s

assistant,

built up bipartisan friendships in the House of

Representatives and also used his knowledge that the loyalty
of Southern Democrats to their party was shaky.

Duberstein'

s

expertise would contribute to the first term's

legislative success.

In fact,

the office helped Reagan to

hold 69 face-to-face meetings with members of Congress
during his first 100 days.

These congressmen had seen

Reagan more in four months than they had of Carter in four
years

14
.

Reagan gave policy-making powers to seven cabinet
councils, which included economic affairs, commerce and
trade, human resources, natural resources, and the

environment, food, and agriculture.

Though this helped to

draw Reagan's staff and Cabinet closer together, consensus
was needed prior to going ahead on policy.

This meant that

fewer policy initiatives arose from these councils and those

policies that did go forward were watered down, although
they were more broadly supported within the administration.
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Policy was to be handled by real experts, not
just
those who,

in Baker's opinion,

president.

would adversely influence the

Baker's management was intolerable to social

conservatives who wanted their agenda advocated by Reagan
more frequently.

Instead, Baker encouraged Gergen, who took

over the Office of Communications from Ursamaro after Brady
was wounded in the March 1981 attempt on Reagan's life, to

employ a communications strategy that relied on mostly
moderate policies and compassionate rhetoric.

Conservatives

believed Reagan went along with this plan because his

popularity remained high and he was on his way to
accomplishing some of his goals.
Without

a

conservative influencing policy choices, the

right wing of the Republican party could be held in check.

"Ronald Reagan entered office as the most ideological

president in history," 15 Stephen Hess writes.
Wirthlin, Reagan's pollster, agreed:

"[Reagan]

Richard
was viewed as

much more conservative than the rank and file voter." 16
But Baker, who may have been unfairly criticized for his

"pragmatism,

"

believed that

a

more moderate course would

help the president increase his ability to deal with the

Democratically-controlled House of Representatives, the
place where budget proceedings had to begin.

Any

legislation passed would also show voters that Reagan was

achieving what he promised.
After failing in his bid to become the chief of staff,
Meese's major responsibility became oversight of the cabinet
committees.

Reagan understood the importance of
42

neutralizing the cabinet, whose members had proved
often to
be too independent-thinking and resistant to changes

proposed by presidents.

Yet even knowing this, the Reagan

administration failed to slow the growth of the bureaucracy

Though the Cabinet may provide input on future policy
direction, no president can expect to place complete trust
in those officials.

Unusually, however, Reagan asked the

Cabinet members to participate in decision making, albeit

under Meese's direction.

Cabinet officers had their most

realistic opportunity to pass along policy suggestions in
these tightly-controlled meetings.

Their input, however,

was extremely limited: the information and advice they

sought to impart was filtered first through Meese and was

then passed on to Deaver and Baker.

The Cabinet had

virtually no opportunity to communicate openly with the
president

.

Written memoranda or group discussion were

usually the only ways for the Cabinet to be heard, but
Reagan was not likely to read memoranda thoroughly and
rarely attended council meetings.
Though Meese got to head the cabinet councils, few

conservatives actually believed this position provided him
any tangible effect on policy.

In fact,

"Much of the New

Right blamed the cumbersome cabinet government system for
the limited attention the administration paid to its

conservative social agenda ." 17

These people hypothesized

that the cabinet government gave the so-called pragmatists
the opportunity to avoid going forward with potentially

controversial, or conservative, policies.
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Meese's

s

:

conservat ivism was adequately contained by the other
members
of the troika in the first four years.

It wasn't until the

second term, as Attorney General, that Meese finally became
an influential conservative, pushing for activist Supreme

Court justices who would impact social policy.

Meese'

activism in the second term was what many conservatives had
hoped to obtain from him earlier.

The cabinet council

system eventually failed because Reagan did not directly

communicate with members of the cabinet.
State Alexander Haig later wrote,

As Secretary of

"Normally,

it was the

staff, not the President, who handed out assignments and

received the finished homework ." 18
For Baker and Gergen, retaining high poll numbers

often became the overriding goal, but this caused the first
term to lose the ideological purity on which conservatives

incorrectly believed Reagan was elected.

Barber contends

that Reagan attempted to foist extremist policies on

Congress,
poor,

such as making cuts in programs that served the

slashing environmental laws, and proposing unneeded

military expenses.

Baker often protected Reagan by

recognizing that the president's goals could alienate

congressmen or the American people.
Baker's recommendations.

Reagan agreed with

Therefore, the staff, under

Baker's guidance, pursued only what could be successfully
sold

Reagan did espouse strongly held
conservative views, but it would often
be their responsibility not only to
determine how to translate those views
44

into policy but to determine as well
which views were to be acted upon 19
.

Reagan's lack of internal communication gave some staff
members the freedom to pursue a wide range of policies that
they believed their leader supported.

Though this "reading

of Reagan s mind" was not always correct,

it did not stop

speechwr iters or even Speakes from doing it.

Most

importantly, the lack of communication meant that

conservatives outside the administration would be

disappointed and disillusioned with the direction of policy.
Reagan's appointees, such as those to the Department of
Education, were not set to make reductions in their

departments despite the philosophy of the president.
As Reagan's close public-relations adviser and deputy

chief of staff, Deaver stood between the president and his

communications staff.

As a middle man, Deaver helped unify

the first term's communications effort and supported Baker
in charting a more moderate course for the administration.

Major items, such as reducing taxes, implementing supplyside economics, and expanding the military, would be

pursued, but conservative issues that might divide the

Reagan coalition were not.

These issues were predominantly

social in nature, such as Reagan's pro-life stance on

abortion and support for prayer in school, and could break
the fragile bonds between the Reagan voters and his

supporters in Congress.
Besides helping to support Baker's decisions, Deaver
was an excellent public-relations strategist who improved
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Reagan's appearance for television.

Deaver was exceptional

at increasing the amount of coverage Reagan
would receive

from both the written and televised media.

A less media-

savvy president may not have been enthused by Deaver'

recommendation that constant publicity be the foremost goal
of the administration.

But Reagan was comfortable bringing

in experts at manipulating television and controlling his

presentation through the media.

These experts understood

that Reagan was an excellent speaker, a trained actor who
was prepared to advance his policies directly into people's

homes via television.

"At least since his Hollywood days,

he has been used to having his appearance managed by

others

."

20

The public appearances of the president were

always scripted.

The limited number of press conferences,

at which reporters may ask difficult questions,

ensured that

Reagan would not relinquish any potential advantages to the

media by flubbing his response.

Many critics believed that Deaver made

a

big

difference in handling the president, that without his work
the presidency was doomed to fail.

They insisted their

prediction had come true when Deaver'

s

successors had

trouble keeping Reagan's image untarnished during the second
term.

Though he was credited with being a public-relations

genius, Deaver was not given respect by all Reagan

supporters

.

Most important to the foreshadowing of the

second term's failures was Buchanan's disagreement with the
analysis of his fellow Republicans that Deaver had been
instrumental in Reagan's successes.
46

Buchanan had long

considered Deaver nothing more than the "Lord of the
Chamber
Pot."

Deaver,

though,

assisted the president in more

vital ways than Buchanan was willing to acknowledge.

Deaver

was responsible for scheduling the president's speeches and

public appearances.

This job was always threatened by

Reagan's astrologer, who was required to authorize the
schedule.

In one astonishing example,

the presidential

debates against challenger Walter Mondale were scheduled

based solely on the favorable outlook of the zodiac.

Still,

making the president's schedule did give Deaver an upper
hand on administration conservatives.

As Regan points out,

"the President's schedule is the single most potent tool in

the White House, because it determines what the most

powerful man in the world is going to do and when he is

going to do it

."

22

The modern presidency'

s

need for external

communications experts likely means that

a

president will

not have much control over his public-relations apparatus.

Presidential handlers have assumed greater control over

publicity of the White House.

And in the Reagan

administration, he would have even less with Baker acting as
a

co-president

.

Under the guidance of Deaver during the

first term, there was a reciprocal control over Reagan.
Reagan'

s

advisers feared that if left on his own to ad lib,

he would slip up in a press conference or major televised

speech,

cite incorrect facts, or speak imprudently while

attempting self-deprecation.

"Speeches and other public

appearances were tightly structured, and the effort was made

to keep the President to his script." 23

The media quickly

publicized his major blunders, such as his awkward comment
that trees caused air pollution.

Perhaps most important to Ronald and Nancy Reagan,

Deaver became

a

good family friend:

Deaver was the best at reading Reagan's
moods, delivering bad news, staging him
in public, or privately coaxing him
into or out of some action the others
thought wise or unwise. 24

Despite all of Deaver'

s

triumphs in working with the media,

conservatives regularly criticized him for being the member
of the troika who most moderated Reagan's once conservative

policies.

As James Watt, Reagan's first Secretary of the

Environment said

-

unknowingly identifying what would become

the conservative's rallying cry in the second term

-

Deaver

had not allowed "Reagan to be Reagan."

2

.

Communications
Reagan's management style may have made him distant

from policy, and there may have been a dichotomy between the

needs of going public and the hopes of passing conservative
legislation, but neither affected his ability to publicize
his agenda.

His use of media tactics did, however, give

communications experts power over policy.

As chief of staff

and a savvy veteran of Washington politics, Baker believed
that all communications operations should be integrated for

both short and long-term planning.
realized after Brady was wounded.

But this could not be

Gergen was moved from his

already powerful position, being named the assistant to the
48

.

president for communications,
over Ursamaro.

a role that

gave him authority

This caused a subtle, though important,

shift in the responsibilities of many members of the
White

House staff.

Gergen gained substantial power because the

Press Office fell under his direct oversight.

Gergen also

oversaw the larger picture on which the administration was
focused and publicized the presidency.

For a short time,

Speakes and Gergen were dual administration spokesmen.
While the Press Office must frequently work in

conjunction with the Communications Office, often the two
staffs are pursuing different strategies:

Rather than targeting local media
outlets, the Press Office caters almost
exclusively to the needs of Washingtonbased reporters who frequent its domain
on a regular basis 25
.

The new staff organization seemed to have a built-in

disadvantage for the media in that neither spokesman knew
all the details of policy creation.

Speakes,

for example,

was excluded from budget discussions while Gergen was barred

from the deliberations on the MX missile.

This gave the

administration a legitimate claim that their spokesmen knew
But this set up also bred

nothing about certain issues.

controversy as each feared exclusion and isolation from the
administration
The president's agenda was strengthened by having a

responsible press secretary who understood that he had to be
in favor with both the administration and the media.

But

the first term also witnessed infighting between Speakes and

Gergen because of their overlapping responsibilities.
49

The

.

friction between them did not affect the policy
orientation
but did hurt the effort to publicize the line of
the
day.

Yet Reagan and Baker, understanding the need to
downplay

conflict, eventually asked Gergen to remove himself from
his
dual role.

After retreating from the press briefings, he

began to concentrate on larger policy issues.
Reagan's laid-back style extended into the direct

communications the staff pursued with him.

Although he had

an agenda defined by conservative principles,

it was only

possible to influence future policy decisions by using
anecdotes or props to impress a point for him.

In the

absence of visual aids, it was nearly impossible to persuade

Reagan to change his views.

Reagan's faith in people he

liked could not be changed easily.

"If Reagan trusted a

staffer, he seldom questioned his recommendations.

The

problem was that once he put his faith in someone, he seemed
unable to revise his judgment about him." 26
little chance that merely presenting

a

There was

better oral argument

would succeed at changing his well-ground beliefs.

This

frustrated Stockman, who tried in vain to show Reagan how
deficits would loom under the 1981 budget proposals.

Stockman tried to explain how the needed "cuts" in the
Defense Department would really just be slowing the rate of
increase
Reagan'

s

management style affected the first term much

as it did the second, but Baker tried to prevent it from

hampering the president's agenda.

Speakes, writing about

his experience at the White House in Speaking Out
50

,

admitted

that he fabricated Reagan quotes in order to speed
up his
work,

an admission that cost him his post - administrat
ion

job.

Speakes could brief the press without consulting

Reagan on the issue because "he assumed he knew what the
President wanted to say ." 27

Deaver's credibility was

similarly damaged when he admitted to assisting Speakes in

making up these quotes.

If these kinds of actions were

taking place at the top of the organizational chart, then it
is evident how lower-level staff members thought they had a

large leeway in their own actions.
The types of policy pursued, however, were carefully

controlled by Deaver and Baker with the assistance of
Wirthlin, an indispensable proponent of specific policies.

Reagan's unusual skills, learned from his years as an actor,

may have made it possible for him to sell policies that
polling data suggested were not widely popular.
Wirthlin'

s

expertise in determining when

a

Despite

policy was not

supported by Americans, the president could often

successfully sell the policy, convincing Congress to vote
with him:
did understand, without needing to
consult Wirthlin' s polls or his cue
cards, that he possessed a special
'something' that transcended the appeal
28
of ordinary politicians
[H] e

.

But Reagan did not use this route often enough to appease

some conservatives.

Reagan did not want an adversarial relationship with
the press,

the media.

though he did place restrictions on the access of
But,
51

Unlike both Ford and Carter, Reagan did
not come into office with a promise for
an open administration.
Furthermore,
he set clear lines of authority in the
White House, and he and his staff
wielded considerable control over the
flow of news from all parts of the
executive branch. 29
In dealing with the press and Congress,

Reagan was careful

to avoid the problems Nixon encountered using a "hardball"

strategy.

While "hardball" would have been out of Reagan's

character anyway, it also was perceived as helping to
strengthen Congress' resolve and permit the media to more

deeply examine his policies.

If

Reagan wished to shun the

media, he would pretend to not hear reporters' questions as
he walked across the White House lawn to his waiting

helicopter.

If policy were not to be disclosed at press

conferences, then his spokesmen would truly be uninformed.

3

.

Speechwri t ino
The external communications could not have taken place

without the speechwriters

.

Reagan promoted policies by

persuading the public with well-crafted rhetoric.

These

popular appeals "over the head" of the Democrat -controlled
House of Representatives were

a

key component of Reagan's

early successes and gave him the needed leadership
credentials.

Careful planning by Reagan's strategists

allowed a moderate agenda to gain acceptance in

a

sharply

divided Congress, where Republicans held the Senate for his
first six years.

52

Reagan's speeches, Barber claims, further separated
rhetoric from actual policy, though Buchanan moved

the two

closer together in the second term.

But polls always tended

to show that the public understood,

and could differentiate,

between Reagan the person and Reagan the policymaker.

His

popularity was not an aberration until his policy failures
and misguided political strategies accumulated during the

second term.

Reagan's public speeches were seen as non-

president ial in character by some experts in communication:
"His manner of communication fits the requirements of

television as a medium

-

or ruling a nation ." 30

With the success he achieved,

not necessarily those of governing

however, this criticism was irrelevant.

Though the president's rhetoric was important, the

communications staff realized that merely getting the
president on television was often enough to maintain his
popularity.

And the American people, especially his

supporters, wanted to see the president in the best light

possible.

"The lesson is clear.

Maintaining popular

support means carefully controlling what is seen rather than
what is said ." 31

Thus Reagan's flubbing of lines was not

nearly as important to the American people as the overall
message he was putting out.
External communications were Reagan's forte in his

normally scripted environment.

The staff carefully watched

for off-the-cuff remarks by the president and took

precautions to avoid them.

When they occurred,

"Deaver,

Speakes, and the others would shake their heads in
53
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.

.

affectionate bafflement and scurry to contain what they
regarded as 'the damage .'" 32 The staff shielded the

president from controversy to retain his high poll numbers.
The manipulation of television news was successfully put

into practice by Reagan's staff, in that the evening news

broadcasts were filled with flattering images of the
president.

It did not matter if the dialogue accompanying

the images was critical of the president or his policies.

CBS's Leslie Stahl learned this the hard way when she was

thanked by Reagan officials for

a

detailed piece that

criticized the president for failing to speak to the press
on its terms

The general philosophical course of Reagan's first

term was prominently on display in the domain of the

speechwriting shop.

For these writers, Reagan literally

only "provided general direction; specific policy came

exclusively from the bottom up ." 33

The ideological content

of Reagan's speeches normally had the dual purpose of

promoting the agenda and changing peoples' opinions.

In

fact

substantial number of those speeches
contain an ordered argument and
relatively few, compared to the most
recent presidents, are mere laundry
lists of points 34

a

.

Reagan'

s

speechwri ters understood their role was to present

the president's ideas clearly and concisely to the American

public

54

Speechwri ters are responsible for translating the
political policies of their superiors into persuasive

and

understandable prose:
The demands of the rhetorical
presidency have heightened the
importance of speechwri ters and
expanded their number in recent
administrations 35
.

The speechwri ters made Reagan's already telegenic

personality come across better with the American public and
showed his desire to please the American people, a

characteristic of Barber's passive -posit ive president.

The

speechwri ters ensured that Reagan used facts to bolster the

policies he advocated.

The first-term speechwri ters also

made sure that Reagan did not use harsh language in his

attempts to persuade: many voters already had the
perception, developed by Carter, that Reagan was "triggerhappy."

To calm these fears,

the speechwri ters had to

soften his tone.
Even former Nixon speechwriter William Safire admits
that the writers must get involved with the policies of the

president, despite the usual reservations from the chief of
staff.

"A speechwriter,

one might think,

is no policy

setter, only an articulation aide whose highest duty is to

reflect the desires of the President and his expert

adviser ." 36

But the predilections and biases of a writer

should be well known to the president and his chief of
staff,

Safire says, allowing them to control the direction

of the administration fully.

55
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,

The first-term speechwriters

,

under the supervision of

Bentley Elliott, were not often left on their own to
create
policy.
The control over the speechwriters was normally
exercised by returning memos to them with suggestions for

proper writing style and eliminating biases:
In the first administration Dick Darman
received, along with the speechwri ter
a copy of each suggestion, and it was
Dick who had the final say on which
suggestions must be included and which
could be ignored. 37

Then the speech went to the president for his input.

Buchanan hoped to correct this problem in the second term by
giving more freedom to the individual writer.
State Department officials interfered with Noonan's
first major speech that she wrote for Reagan during his 1984

trip to China.
line,

a

They wanted to correct her draft line by

constant frustration for a woman who deeply admired

Reagan
What I learned was that I would have to
watch out at the White House.
for the
kind of editors who want to sit around
and give you their opinions on things
instead of concentrating on the text
and catching your factual mistakes. 38
.

.

Factual errors that were not caught could lead Reagan to

bolster his preconceived beliefs.

Proofreading and thorough

research are essential to ensure no errors, inconsistencies,
or change in policy direction occur.

Yet errors and

arguments crept in more frequently during the later Reagan
years,

even though he had his "speeches carefully crafted by

the largest and most professional groups of writers and
31
researchers ever assembled in the White House."
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Critics of using public communication to influence

policy see the rhetoric as temporary political maneuvering
that hurts the entire political process:

public will be merely superfluous

-

"At times,

going

fluff compared with the

substance of traditional political exchange

." 40

Reagan

altered this perception, however, by having his speeches

prepared with substantially more content and point -by-point

policy arguments than earlier presidents.

Reagan's speeches

were used to persuade people rationally, more than

emotionally, that the policies he advocated would set the

course for a better and stronger America.

C.

Expectations

Like other observers of modern American politics,

Barber believes the increasing length of the presidential

campaign and the need to win primaries forces new challenges
upon the modern president.

The biggest of these challenges

is following through on the voters'

expectations:

Our generation's contribution to
politics, the endless campaign, still
manages to throw down an iron curtain
between the suppositions of running for
President and the actualities of being
one 41
.

Reagan used the bully pulpit to influence the electorate.
He was able to tap into the American public's short

attention span and charm people with his wit, Barber claims.
Reagan's often careless attitude led him to believe facts
that had no basis in reality and had no relevance to his

57

policies.

Barber's cynical view expresses little faith in

the intelligence of choices made by the American people.

Barber seeks to explain how President Reagan attained
his great popularity.

rhetoric"

4

*-

Barber points to the "manipulative

used by Reagan in the 1980 election as the

major factor in obtaining electoral support.

While male

voters were not bothered by this, women tended to see Reagan
as cold and calculating.

There was certainly a gender gap

occurring, and James Baker, realizing this, tried to soften

Reagan's image.
Robert Denton, a communications expert, provides an

especially gloomy portrait of how the modern presidential
campaigns harm the president's ability to succeed once in
the White House.

Popularity becomes the sole importance of

the presidency, Denton claims, even though the president

should be working with other branches of government to

accomplish goals.
rather than

a

"Policy making is a collective affair

competitive endeavor." 43

In other words,

politics is the art of compromise.
Yet the potential exists for the president's

promotional techniques to cause the public's hopes and

expectations to rise too high:

"The presidential press-

agentry has not only expanded public expectations of the

presidency but also distorted the self -perceptions of
persons within the presidential establishment."

Reagan

s

major campaign issues, emphasizing supply-side economics and

protecting the United States from Soviet threat, required
him to set his agenda in motion quickly.
58

Reagan's advisers,

however,

saw a need to protect his popularity by going over

others' heads when necessary, making other political bodies
less likely and able to act on their own volition.

D.

Results

The failed attempt on Reagan's life created unique

circumstances for the less than three -month-old presidency.
Prior to the attempted assassination, Reagan's agenda was

stalled in Congress.

His speedy recovery from near death

won him praise and renewed support from the public and
Congress.

Barber suggests that this may have given Reagan

the ability to succeed in passing a wider presidential

program than otherwise would have been possible for

a

Republican president in the institutional setting.
While conservatives believe that the Washington media
and the Eastern Establishment press, such as the nightly

network news broadcasts and The New York Times or The

Washington Post

,

are tougher on Republican politicians than

Democrats, there is little evidence to validate this belief.

Reagan's first year, in fact, was characterized by the

extended honeymoon with the media.

Even before the

assassination attempt, Reagan was given

a full

chance to

succeed, having been elected to lower the inflation Carter
left behind.

"The economy was certainly the dominant issue

of the campaign," wrote William Schneider

45
.

Thus the

media did not immediately discredit his economic program as
"voodoo economics," the term candidate George Bush applied
to Reagan's vision.
59
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Adapting the president's campaign promises to
political reality is the responsibility of his staff,

which,

during Reagan's first months in office, was prepared
to push
for large policy changes using an orderly process.
The
LSG,

led by Baker, met every afternoon between 4:30 and
5:30 p.m
to work on shaping Reagan's ideas and designing policy.

Although the focus of the group was completely on the
implementation, not the development, of policy, its

recommendations could have
policy.

4b

a

significant effect on that

And Wirthlin had already formulated

for Reagan's legislative success.

a

method

Called the Wirthlin Plan,

Meese explains that it
envisioned, first and foremost, a
strong initiative on tax and budget
issues.
The idea was to exploit the
force of public opinion - to remind the
legislators of who had elected them and thereby counter the special
interest pressures we knew would be
mounted in opposition to the Reagan
program 47
.

.

Duberstein was instrumental in selling the Reagan budget on
Capitol Hill, arranging a White House visit from House
Budget Committee Chairman Jim Jones, D-Oklahoma, who was

pushing for reconciliation on the tax bill.

Duberstein said

that "For most issues you have to lobby all 435 congressmen

and almost all 100 Senators." 48

Reagan's public-relations efforts and external

communications with both citizens and members of Congress
could hardly have performed better than they did in his
first year.

Reagan's communications staff worked with

Stockman to prepare the president's economic agenda for sale
60

"

to Congress.

The first year's emphasis on the budget
and

building a relationship with Congress by using

administration numbers gave Stockman

a

prominent role.

Stockman tried to use his position to coerce cabinet
secretaries to follow through on the proposed budget and
future tax cuts, but it was Reagan's stubbornness that

prevented Stockman from securing all his wishes.
Stockman provided details to the LSG about his daily

meetings with congressmen during the 1981 budget battle.
But Stockman was powerless to persuade members of the group

when he felt

a

new economic direction, moving away from both

the entitlement and tax cuts, was necessary.

Crucial to these early successes was procuring public

pressure for lower taxes and

Wirthlin Plan.

a

smaller government using the

Communications officials did

a

tremendous

job of "enlightening" Congress as to what Americans demanded
of their government.

This pressure would permit Reagan not

only to obtain the desired budget cuts but also the KempRoth tax cut.
presidency,

Throughout the first year of Reagan's

"The White House communications unit helped

convince Congress that public opinion was behind the

administration's iniatives
that,

.
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Polls already indicated

after Carter's presidency, Americans had less faith in

their government, which ironically Reagan later helped to
revitalize.

Though public opinion may not have been behind

all his policies,

communications specialists were able to

persuade Congress that Reagan's economic agenda was
supported.

But the president had to take care that he did
61

not go too far or his support would be weakened,

In 1981,

for example, Medicare had at least 85 percent
support; 50

school lunches 53 percent.

51

Reagan's supporters believed that he needed to slash
specific budgets to make the government work better and for
his supply-side economic program to succeed.

But Reagan was

"so enthusiastically in favour of delegation that policy

execution often remained seriously unattended." 52

distanced himself from unpopular spending cuts.

Reagan
Cabinet

secretaries became an unlikely ally in providing him with
shield that many presidents have not had.

a

Paul Light claims

that Reagan was really just trying to improve his political

standing in Washington for the short term:
Indeed, my data suggest that Reagan's
year of greatest legislative
achievement, 1981, was built almost
entirely on short-term policy proposals
designed to pay out quickly, whether
politically or economically. 53

These proposals included Reagan's insistence to have both
the popular tax cuts

Democrats)

(for more than the one year proposed by

and an increase in military spending.

Reagan and his advisers had to make an important

decision that hinged on whether to go public on the GrammLatta budget reconciliation bill or wait to employ the

public strategy on the Kemp-Roth tax cut.
at the heart of the Reagan economic agenda,

Both items were
which,

at its

most basic, was about reducing taxes and domestic spending.
But both were not likely to be approved by Congress with

Reagan's limited political capital.
62

Reagan opted to wait

until Congressional debate on the Kemp-Roth
tax cut before
using public persuasion.
Constituents would place pressure
on their representatives to change their
votes.
The
eventual fervor for a tax cut, which many people
believed
would lead to higher disposable incomes, was created
by

Reagan

s

appeals and the simplicity of the message.

Bargaining served Reagan well during the first term,

especially in surviving many of the close votes on the 1981
budget, but he did not stand by this strategy for long.

Reagan authorized Stockman to use

a

personal manner to sell

the budget and tax cuts on Capitol Hill.

Stockman obtained

a

In doing so,

coalition of the liberal Northern

Republicans and the conservative "Boll Weevil" Southern
Democrats.

The problem with this coalition was that it

could not easily be replicated on social and foreign policy
issues.

Stockman's revised projections showed an $82

billion deficit in 1982 and

a $116

billion deficit in 1984.

The budget battle of 1981 is testimony to the concerns

Reagan had with using the bargaining strategy, even though
he did receive short-term benefits from it.

As long as

Reagan retained a high level of support, he could go over
the heads of Congress and even persuade Democrats under the

influence of popular Speaker Tip O'Neill.

"His capacity to

succeed... depends much on congressional relations; and his

public communication is

a

factor in both these and in the

wider endorsement of his expenditure goals.""

4

The budget

deals proved that Reagan had voters on his side.

Polling

completed jointly by CBS News and The New York Times between
63

.

Sept.

21-27,

1981 showed that 64 percent trusted
Reagan to
make the right decisions on the entire federal
budget, and
69 percent believed he would be equally
successful on

defense spending.

But he hit a low point on Social

Security, where only 48 percent trusted him 55 after
he made

threats to overhaul that system.

Reagan backed off on these

threats at the Republican convention, promising to leave
Social Security off the table.
the areas to cut,

The staff carefully chose

rolling back expenditures in some

departments by imposing user fees or other similar payment
schemes
The president's poll-driven strategy required that

voters remain supportive of Reagan's policies, not just

Reagan the happy-go-lucky politician.

"Regardless of the

skill of this administration, however, the cuts could not

have been enacted if the majority of voters had been

unsympathetic to the policy." 56
staff,

Reagan, his high-level

and his communications officials worked together to

maintain the base of popularity that he obtained from their
1981 successes.

The president needed this popularity to

survive the following year's recession.

used Reagan'

s

Deaver skillfully

initial popularity from the budget battles to

legitimate further public appeals.

Still,

in the midst of a

recession, there was little chance that Reagan would have as

much influence over the budget proceedings.

His political

capital and standing with the voters had declined, and his

further demands for cuts to social programs went too far,

64

.

even for members of Congress who had earlier
supported his
goals
Not surprisingly, Reagan's popularity declined
as the

economy slowed in 1982, making it improbable that he
could
persist with his economic plan. Reagan's approval ratings

plummeted during the recession.
between 37

(Gallup)

On January 19,

and 39 percent

still gave Reagan their approval. 57

(Harris)

1983,

only

of respondents

He hit a lower mark

between Jan. 28 and 31 when only 35 percent approved of his
job performance in a Gallup poll. 58

But the president's

renewed popularity, after overcoming the 1982 recession,
could permit a wider range of policies to be enacted even in
the absence of traditional bargaining.

This potential

advantage, however, was mostly offset by the large deficit

figures which stalled Reagan's further tax reduction plans.

Americans remained surprisingly confident in the

president's policies.

Just as his initial measures were

designed to halt inflation, the public expected Reagan to
get out of the recession.

His poll numbers looked better

when people were asked whether what he had so far

accomplished would be good for the country in the long run.
More than half those questioned, 53 percent, agreed with his

Only 35 percent said Reagan's actions would not help

goals.

end the recession.

59

The general strength of Reagan's presidency was based
on the perceptions that he was both tough and moral.

An ABC

News/ The Washington Post poll taken between Feb. 25 and

March

2,

1983 showed that overwhelming numbers believed
65

Reagan was a strong leader (60-37 percent)
and an honest
person (70-20 percent)
These numbers were posted in spite
.

of the fact that the same respondents also
believed, by a

42-53 percentage count, that he was not keeping
his original

campaign promises. 60

The divergence is best explained by

the recession, but the Baker-led strategy to moderate
the

agenda might have contributed to this feeling.

Still,

a

weaker president than Reagan would likely have seen his poll
numbers fall more dramatically.

In contrast to the view

espoused by Barber that Reagan's policies were mean
spirited, Reagan's first-term successes may have actually

come at a cost to his own credibility as the leader of a

conservative realignment.

Reagan allowed Baker to moderate

his agenda by not pursuing conservative social values in

legislative policy.
Besides his domestic success, Reagan understood that

setting foreign policy goals early in his administration

would improve his standing nationally and internationally.
Crises abroad tend to improve
short term.

a

president's ratings for the

For example, Carter's approval ratings actually

went up when Americans at the embassy in Tehran were taken

hostage in 1979.

It was the prolonged internment that

became a crisis for the Carter presidency.
Reagan,
coup.

For Ronald

the 1983 invasion of Grenada was a public relations

Even the terrorist attack on marines stationed in

Lebanon gave Reagan's approval ratings

a boost.

The heavy use of public opinion polls to run the

government during the 1981-1985 time frame affected the type
66

of leadership Americans received.

Rather than being the

decisive president who would identify an issue
based on
ideology alone, Reagan and his staff instead
responded to
concerns from the public that were identified in
polling
data.

Reagan was criticized as one who led by the

popularity of the issue.

Every time he used a public

opinion poll, conservatives believed, Reagan was pandering
to the moderates in the administration and inhibiting the

conservative revolution.
The expanded use of public appeals, professor of

political science and author Samuel Kernell says, makes
future compromise between a president and Congress more

difficult.

"By imposing costs and failing to offer

benefits, going public is more akin to force than to

bargaining ." 61
this,

Reagan and Congressional leaders proved

as less popular policy,

even when it would benefit

many people, was virtually impossible to pass.

One senator

even promised to vote against anything the president

proposed because of the administration's tactics.
publ ic - speaking role, however,

Reagan's

is not the only explanation

for his tremendous successes in the first term.

In these

early years, the communications staff knew the objectives
that were being sought.

No one was entirely clear as to the

goals Reagan wanted pursued in the second term, including
the chief of staff.

Polls can help alleviate the concerns that going

public sometimes raises.

By studying and interpreting

public opinion polls, the president and his staff could
67

.

almost instantly evaluate the success
of their external
communications and understand what could be
delivered to the
American people. A president, though, will want
to go

beyond this, understanding to ask whether he
really wants
polls to control his policies. Unlike Nixon's claims

to a

silent majority" that supported his issues, Wirthlin
tried
to identify people's real opinions and the potential
that

existed to change these beliefs.

In addition to the polls,

Wirthlin had another resource that had not been fully
exploited: examining the papers outside Washington, D.C. to

discover the issues they were writing about and

editorializing on.

The daily news summary,

to President Nixon,

kept Reagan abreast of developments

first supplied

within the media nationwide.

Republican senators in 1983 feared that Reagan was
shying away from more budget cuts because of low poll
numbers.

Reagan did not want to risk lowering his

popularity at this time for the sake of policy:
Strategic presidents balance their
ongoing need for popular support
against their desire to achieve policy
goals important to them and their
party's core constituencies, and
therefore they do not always
automatically act to increase their
popularity 62

Reagan's accomplishments did not come at the expense of his
In

popularity, but his policies did become less well liked.
1984,

70 percent of those polled gave Reagan a negative

rating on his handling of the federal budget and deficit.
In an NBC News poll taken from Feb.

68

3-4,

1985,

,

'

,

77 percent of

.

the respondents blamed Reagan for the size
of the federal
deficit. 64 This did not matter to Reagan's
advisers

because it was not

a

major issue for the electorate.

But

the $200 billion annual deficits, according to
Light, meant

that Reagan was not free to add issues to his agenda
in the

second term.

This eventually reduced his staff's

flexibility
Wirthlin's skills allowed high-level Reagan staffers
to understand how pressuring representatives in their own

home districts could be effective and how far the president

could move to the right.

While his staff was studying the

polls, however, Reagan was content not to:

Reagan was rarely a poll-driven
president.
He took many positions,
most notably in supporting the Contras
and in opposing abortion, where
Wirthlin' s polls found him out of step
with American public opinion. 65

Reagan could take these views because he could speak so
well

.

Neustadt argues that the talent to inspire the public

through speech varies among presidents:

"Expertise in

presidential power seems to be the province not of

politicians as

a

class but of extraordinary politicians." 66

When a new president takes office, he is seen as competent
for having withstood the assaults that come from the

campaign trail.

But this is not always enough to consider

his rhetoric great.

Despite Gergen's excellent work, he was increasingly

frustrated with Reagan's performance.

Gergen and Baker had

both encouraged Reagan to protect some middle ground so he
69

.

could win re election in 1984.

Gergen admitted his dislike

for what Reagan was doing to the press
conference format.
He wanted Reagan to be more friendly to
the media and more

willing to discuss important issues with them.

"

[P]

conferences have become increasingly unproductive.

ress

They're

not as spontaneous or as intimate as they should be." 67
Yet the lack of press conferences did not appear to
bother

Reagan during the first term:
Particular care was taken with the
staging of press conferences, each of
which was preceded by two days of
rehearsals in which answers were
supplied to all the questions that the
White House staff could anticipate. 68

And conservatives did not respect the work Gergen had done.
Complaints came from within the administration that "Gergen
was too cozy in his relationship with reporters, and they

accused him of being
leaks." 69

a

major source of White House

But Regan and Haig both admit that many White

House aides were given the directive to leak the

administration's inside information. 70

Many of these leaks

were directed at friendly congressmen who the administration
felt could be trusted to vote in support of the Reagan

agenda

Gergen finally resigned from his post as

communications director when he felt too much attention was

given to the visual aspects at the expense of the written
press.

Reagan, he said, had entered a deceitful

relationship with the Washington-based reporters.

Reagan administration officials viewed those that
70

And

represented newspapers as
message out.

a less

effective means to get the

Gergen was also upset about Reagan's attempts

to set the agenda for the television networks.

Most

importantly, though, the communications director
began to
feel isolated in his battle against the more
conservative

elements in the incoming administration, since he no longer

would have the prominent support of James Baker.

Gergen

would become critical of the direction of Reagan's second
term in frequent essays for U.S. News

evidence that there was

a

&

World Report

,

major change in the style and

substance of that position.

Reagan's victory in 1980 was supposed to be

a

signal

to conservatives that they would have a man of like mind in

the White House.

Though it was not stressed in the 1980

campaign, people understood that Reagan believed in moral

values and
society.

return to the Judeo-Christian roots of American

a

But those who expected Reagan to advance both a

social and economic agenda in the first term would be

disappointed.

He simply did not have the political capital

to move on the social issues.

The first-term staff was also unexpectedly moderate,
at least compared to the Republicans who arrived with Reagan

from California. Baker did not share every conservative
belief; Gergen understood the difficulty of promoting a

conservative agenda and passing it through Congress; Deaver

wanted to keep the president's popularity high by softening
his image.

Only Meese, who was ultimately stymied in his

efforts, could qualify as a conservative conscience for the
71

.

.

first term.

And though Reagan had

the Senate,

a

Republican majority in

some of the senators had campaigned to the
left

of Reagan and could not be counted on to vote
for his

agenda
Should he choose to do so, the president is the only

politician who can wage all his political wars through the
media.

'A

president can, nearly at any time, command the

attention of the media and speak directly to the American
people

.

"

The usefulness of this form of communication

declined in the second term.

Institutional factors may have

caused a drop in the effectiveness of popular appeals, but

many blame the repetitiveness of the second term's agenda.
The second-term staff was less inclined to study
polls,

arguing that the personal popularity of the president

alone could be translated into legislative triumphs.

The

conservatives, many of whom took over key positions in the

White House following the 1984 campaign, hoped to initiate
and then pass domestic policy using Reagan'

ratings as their only leverage.

s

high approval

This strategy for passing

legislation hinged on the president retaining high poll
numbers to counter the Democrat-controlled Congress, which

would be generally hostile to the administration's
proposals
James Baker became

a

more important figure, both

politically and ideologically, than many political writers,
like Barber,

initially expected.

Barber's analysis of the

Reagan presidency, written shortly after the first term
ended,

is valuable for this thesis because he identifies the
72

weaknesses inherent in the president's agenda and
strategies. As a commentator, Barber sees "meanness"
center of many of Reagan's policies.
to how Reagan could first become,

popular.

at the

Barber is puzzled as

and then later remain,

so

Barber views negatively, for instance, the 1981

budget, which slashed social programs and cut entitlements

while expanding the military budget:

A visitor from some alien planet,
discovering this pattern of cruelty and
repression, might well posit a monster
at the center of it, an evil Professor
Moriarty or Darth Vader controlling the
attack on the defenseless. 72
This jaded portrait of the American people's perception of

Reagan as

a

"kindly old grandpa" was precisely the dangerous

type of president Barber had predicted Reagan would be in an

article in the Jan. 20, 1981 The Washington Post

.

Many of those who disagreed with Reagan's policy
positions, though, could comprehend why he became

a

warm

figure for many: he projected wit, humor, and truthfulness.

Reagan's Hollywood acting skills probably helped sell, or at

minimum gloss over, unpopular policy.

Yet in spite of

constant reminders about his personal visions and beliefs,
the American people eventually discovered a way to separate

their adoration for "Reagan the man" from their reservations
about "Reagan the ideological conservative."

Many Americans

still liked Reagan but were becoming less pleased with his

accomplishments.
the economy,

Still, people were basically content with

the major issue on which votes would turn:

Louis Harris found the
public gave Reagan positive marks for
In late 1984,

73

his handling of only two issues:
inflation and the overall economy.
So,

as Wirthlin explains,

73

the 1984 election was not

determined by the candidates' personalities or
negative
voting by the public, but rather by the voters'
happiness
with the economy.
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CHAPTER V
SECOND TERM
A.

Res ults of the 1984 Campaign

The people responsible for the Reagan re-election

effort decided to run an almost issue-free campaign
in 1984,
re-working the themes their candidate had successfully
used
to defeat Carter.

Reagan was pleased to let his first-term

record and political resume speak for themselves.

He cited

his accomplishments by asking voters if they were better off

than they were in 1980.

voters that he needed

a

However, he also explained to

second term in order to pass

leftover policies, continue the rapid economic recovery, and

maintain an aggressive foreign policy.

This type of

campaign provided fodder for Reagan's critics, who saw the

president's popularity increasing despite the failure to
introduce new policy or recognize the deficiencies in his

agenda

Clearly the 1984 presidential election
demonstrated that political issues and
ideology matter little in selecting a
president.
The polls continually
showed that voters favored Ronald
Reagan based on elements of persona and
charisma but disagreed with his issue
positions 1
The voters, though, apparently not having lost faith in

Reagan's leadership skills or positive thinking, handed him
an easy win over former Vice President Walter Mondale.

The

1984 election confirmed support for some of Reagan's views.

"Most Americans not only like Reagan but agreed with what he

was saying, at least on the issues most important to

79

them

" 2

Yet Reagan's effectiveness as a party
leader and

.

outstanding orator, both still in evidence
during the
campaign, would deteriorate in the following
years.

While Reagan's landslide victory in 1984 seemed
to
provide him with a mandate, this margin was not
necessarily

based on winning the opinions of Americans, even
though the
ideological differences between Reagan and Mondale were

well-defined during the campaign.

The American people

understood that they would have to choose which politician's
beliefs
prevail.

,

world views, and personal values would

But because the second term would focus so much on

the value debate, the extent of Reagan's mandate in this
area,

at least to members of Congress,

was going to

determine the success of the agenda.
Chief of Staff Donald Regan did not want the second

administration to devote itself solely to appearances.

That

emphasis, he believed, had stalled policy in the first term.

Regan writes that the "preoccupation with outward style
[came]

at the expense of inner conviction." 3

However,

Regan did not realize that the economic policy and securityrelated issues, both important to the conservative agenda,

received a far less visible mandate from voters in 1984 than
in 1980.

Though Reagan's electoral achievement made it seem

unlikely to occur, the going-public tactics that worked so
well in advancing his policies from 1981 to 1985 were not

nearly as successful afterward.

There was a significant

drop off in his political capital, a crucial element for

president who depended on passing legislation rather than
80

a

using executive orders or other administrative
devices.
Reagan and his staff continued the same
communications

strategy that had won him earlier victories.
While creating policy would be a challenge
because
there were no passionate issues cultivated
during the
campaign, the real problem for administration
conservatives
was the newly discovered difficulty in selling Reagan

policies to the American public.

Even if it is conceded

that Reagan won the value debate, this would mean little if
his chief of staff could not prepare a suitable agenda for
the second term.

B.
1.

Re-staffing the White House

Chief of Staff
The supposedly renewed emphasis on a conservative

agenda had its origin just twelve days before Reagan's
second inauguration, when the president agreed that Chief of
Staff James Baker and Treasury Secretary Donald Regan could
swap jobs.

Regan and Baker had already agreed to the

exchange in the fall but needed the formal approval of the
president.

Reagan gave little thought as to how Regan's

appointment as chief of staff might affect the direction of

policy or the quality of its development.

According to

newspaper writer Hedrick Smith, the change threw "into
turmoil efforts to formulate Reagan's agenda."

4

Already

there had been no massive planning effort conducted by the
The eventual stagnation in

LSG prior to the second term.

policy creation became

a

convenient excuse for the second81

term failures.

The lack of new policy ideas during
the

campaign meant that creation of policy would
be the
responsibility of Regan and his incoming staff.
The new staff Reagan appointed had less
experience

than the first-term team and did not prepare as
well for
their task of advancing policy. As Stephen Hess
put it,

Reagan was "receiving advice from a smaller, shallower,
and
politically less savvy pool at the White House ." 5 Lobbying
on Capitol Hill would also not be as effective with

Friedersdorf and Duberstein gone from the West Wing.

While

it is convenient to blame Regan's inexperience for the

failures of the second term, President Reagan must assume

responsibility for his ignorance that such

a

major overhaul

in the leadership of his staff posed risks to his

effectiveness.

For instance, there was a shift toward

giving the president more to do:
[T] he replacement of Baker by Regan
would lead to deactivation of the
protective system that had repeatedly
put the White House staff on damagecontrol alert whenever the president
had blundered in the first term
6

.

Much like Baker, Regan would try to become Reagan's copresident, advising him on the course to pursue.

referred to Regan as "prime minister."

Some even

But unlike Baker,

Regan did not want to use Wirthlin's polls to moderate the

president's agenda and did not have the same level of
expertise in formulating policy.
Though Wirthlin had provided vital information that

measured support for Reagan's policies, he was not expected
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.

to have a similar influence over
Regan.

The moderate

agenda, Regan believed, may have been
followed because of
the poll numbers:
In my opinion this failure of political
will stemmed in significant measure
from a superficial belief on the part
of some of Reagan's people that his
agenda was unfashionable
Reagan was
continuously being pressured to
compromise in ways that preserved the
influence and the policies of the
defeated opposition 7
.

.

.

.

For instance, the LSG prepared two economic agendas, one
that was ideal for Reagan's beliefs and the other that could

pass through the House.

Regan saw this as using polls to

deny a conservative program from being implemented.

Martin Anderson says this was not the case:

But

"It was Reagan,

and Reagan alone, who decided that four-fifths of a loaf,

especially

a

loaf that was perhaps too large to begin with,

was better than no loaf

."

8

Nevertheless, Regan forged

ahead with his ideas on restoring some of Reagan's original
goals

Regan rapidly made

a

number of changes to the Baker-

led staff that had performed so well for the president

throughout the first term:
The swift moves he had made to overhaul
the command structure and consolidate
his own power base were largely
directed at the staffs he inherited
from Baker and Meese; and he replaced
numerous deputies with people he knew
would be loyal to him
9

.

Many critics fault the second-term staff for not having
enough political skill or good judgment to overcome the

president's hands-off style.

Reagan "did not have the
83

political sensitivity and eye for political
danger of any of
the three men he replaced ." 10 Unwilling
to be influenced
by others, Regan made that claim that the
president was his
only master. But this did not hide his own
inexperience.
Regan later admitted that he was surprised the press
had such

a

large role in what Reagan could accomplish.

"I

was shocked by the extent to which the press determined
the

everyday activities, and even the philosophical tenor, of
the Presidency.

1,11

The new chief of staff did not seem

prepared to handle the day-to-day activities running the
White House required.

Rather than having face-to-face

meetings with his staff, as Baker had, Regan preferred
written memos that outlined policy.
Regan instituted

a

presidential decision-making

process that resembled Baker's only on the surface.

believed the president needed to play
shaping policy.
lot of us,

a

He

larger role in

"Policy will be set by discussions among a

finally the President deciding on the policy and

then going from there

."

12

Few options were actually

presented to the president, however, and Regan drew fire
from some in the administration for not giving the president

enough to do.

It was also clear that Regan was less capable

than Baker at judging the merits of policy.

Gaining control of and power over other staff members
was important to Regan.

At one time, under his directive,

communication by the senior staff was nearly closed down:
So that the flow of news would come
only from the proper quarter - the
White House Press Office - at one point
84

I laid down the rule that
no member of
the senior staff could talk to the
press unless a member of the White
House Press Office staff was present. 13

This action caused the corresponding flow
of information to
the media to be severely restricted.
Policy promotion, as

Gergen proved, depends on more than just the
president's
public speaking.
The loss of Baker and Darman to Treasury, coupled with
the later departures of Gergen and Deaver,

closed out the

moderating influences on Reagan and sealed a more
conservative direction.

But the exact nature of this

conservatism had yet to be determined.

As chief of staff,

Regan would have the opportunity to dictate the kinds of
changes he wanted to take place.

But the appointment of

Buchanan left the type of conservatism in doubt.

2

.

Communications
Regan needed

bring controversy.

a

communications director who would not
However, Regan believed that Reagan's

public appeal in the first term had been built mostly on

appearances while Gergen'

moderate agenda.

s

success depended on Baker's

The choice of Buchanan to fill the vacant

communications position was, Regan admits in his
autobiography, designed to protect his own right flank:

Regan brought a hard-charging,
combative approach to White House
policy, particularly in choosing a
confrontational right-wing newspaper
columnist, Patrick Buchanan, as
communications director. 14
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Moving to the right did not suit the
president well, causing
image problems to arise that he had seemingly
conguered in
the first term.

Regan believed he was acting correctly by

protecting his conservative flank, but it eventually
proved
to be more than he could handle when he
could not control
Buchanan
Conservatives were still restless for their policy
ideas to gain acceptance in the White House.

effectively used Deaver as
Baker,

a

Baker had

shield against Meese

.

Unlike

though, Regan did not have a Deaver clone to assist

him in preventing an overly conservative agenda from coming
to fruition or simply in protecting the course he

envisioned.

Rather than finding a director who would only

carry out the responsibilities of a long-term publicrelations campaign, Regan chose

a

man who would also

endeavor to have an immediate impact on policy questions and
intended to put in place

a

promotional program for

conservative principles.
Buchanan, once the most ideological of Nixon's skilled

speechwriters

,

wanted his staff to have more influence over

the direction of policy.

Buchanan's emphasis on policy

creation, rather than just policy promotion, disturbed many

observers,

including Gergen, who had worked hard to make

Reagan effective at advancing policy through Congress.
Buchanan's previous experience gave him sound reasons to
believe that he could assist in setting policy.

During the

Nixon years, fellow speechwriter William Safire and Buchanan
met weekly with Herbert Klein and other staff members to
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manage political issues and projects that
did not require
daily deadlines. Buchanan's hard-hitting
speeches became
legendary, such as the one he scripted for
Vice President
Spiro Agnew's 1970 Des Moines speech that took
aim against
Eastern Establishment media elites. Buchanan had
also been
used to draft policy positions that required tough
talk

from

the president and did not need to appeal to what
Nixon saw
as a vocal minority:

Nixon never wanted us to work in
committee, not only because of his
abhorrence of watered-down committee
writing, but he wanted to cast his
speeches according to the 'tilt,' as he
put it, of his writers. 15

Regan knew about Buchanan's use of divisive rhetoric and the

complications that could arise by choosing him as the

communications director.
Buchanan believed that the nation had twice taken

a

conservative turn by electing and then re-electing Reagan.
This view was loosely supported by the possibility of a

conservative realignment of the voting public, based on both
social and economic issues, that resulted from the 1980
election.

Republicans gained 33 seats in the House of

Representatives and took 12 Senate seats, though only the
latter victory gave Reagan

a

majority with which to work.

The House remained out of reach.

Nevertheless, Buchanan

believed the victories should give the president the
ambition to push for an agenda that better fit his own
beliefs.

But presidents need tools beyond just ideological

commitment to secure sound policy.
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Unfortunately, this

.

attitude trapped the second-term staff in

a Catch-22:

rely

on the polls and disappoint the conservative
supporters or
ignore the polls and suffer defeat in Congress.

Conservative Republicans had voted for Reagan in
1980
and 1984 because they believed he was their best
chance to
bring family values and a social conservatism back
to

America.

His inability to deliver on these promises in the

first term set the stage for the problems he encountered in
the second.

A seasoned veteran of White House politics and

the hostilities between Congress and the president, Buchanan

took a much more active interest in policy than Gergen.

Buchanan saw himself as the most legitimate voice for the
right wing in the White House, which gave him independent

leverage within the administration and among conservative

party members.

Unity between the chief of staff and his

communications director did not exist.
gap in the ability to publicize

a

This left a critical

unified message from the

administration
Buchanan's post was supposed to give him
in the daily White House operations.

a

large role

Almost immediately

after his arrival, however, Buchanan showed that he would
have little to do with the daily White House press

operations.

The policy-setting role actually permitted

Buchanan to chair weekly Saturday meetings that helped to
drum up support for the Contras.

Buchanan also set up

meetings for Reagan with Contra leaders.
Buchanan's push for

a

conservative agenda in both

domestic and foreign policy often gave rise to tensions
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between the Regan and Buchanan staffs,

This conservatism

also took away from the unity that had developed
in the
first term among the key staff positions.
Internal battles,
once easily pacified, intensified.
Speechwriters
,

for

example, battled the State Department and Regan's

assistants, who were often denounced as the "mice," while

Buchanan was busy fighting with moderate staff members like
Edward Rollins, who had wanted to use the Office of Public
Liaison to realign voters.

Unfortunately for Reagan's

ardent supporters, the focus on re-establishing the

president's conservative agenda led to an overall decline in
the quality of policy promotion.

The second term's

rightward shift affected the staff's ability to define

clearly the policies to be promoted.
Buchanan,

like his immediate predecessor, had worked

under President Nixon.

But there was an obvious contrast

between the political beliefs of Gergen, the former director
of research and writing under Nixon,

and Buchanan.

Although

each carried to their position their own hard-earned,

Republican credentials, they viewed differently their roles
within both the political party and the White House.

These

differences affected how policy was conveyed to the public.
At the time of his appointment, many in the media

immediately asserted that Buchanan would be too outspoken to
hold the job.

While he was barely visible in the first few

months on the job, the dormancy did not last long.

To

defend his conservatism, Buchanan encouraged speechwriters
to write more hard-hitting presidential speeches and act as
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.

policy shapers.

The speechwriting office "was where the

philosophical, ideological, and political tensions
of the
administration got worked out." 17 Buchanan envisioned

that

his conservative agenda, mirroring that of the
president's,

could be realized by these conservative speechwri
ters

3

.

Speechwrit incr

Buchanan was very pleased with the speechwriting shop
and the media relations personnel that he inherited from
Gergen.

Though the development of

a

typical Reagan speech

followed a routine during the first term, this was disrupted
in the later years by the hostilities between Regan and

Buchanan and their respective offices.

The speech would be

drafted and sent to senior staff members to review and make
changes.

"In staffing,

a

speech was sent out to all the

important members of the White House staff and the pertinent

White House offices." 18

editing

a

In the face of their conflict,

speech in an orderly fashion was

a

challenge.

The chief of staff tried to remain in control of the

situation.

Regan's favorite communicating tool, as always,

was the memo.

"It said that major presidential speeches

would now be prepared from an outline approved by the chief
of staff and other senior staff as appropriate." 19

Noonan

said this meant the speechwri ters would simply receive more

criticism because the president would likely sound bad in
his public addresses if non-experts were given more

authority
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The type of conservative agenda
became a conflict
between Regan's aides, but the real
battleground for control
could be found in the speechwriting shop.
The new

supervision over the speechwriters created
two problems,
Noonan said: an "art problem" and a "policy
problem."
Everyone outside the writing shop thought they

knew how to

write speeches:

Speechwriting naturally started rows
because debates and arguments would go
on for years but finally at some point
policy had to be announced and
articulated in speeches. 20
The problem was exacerbated under Reagan because the

speechwriters' roles were not clearly defined.

The

president did not know the exact views espoused by each
speechwr i ter

.

Nor did Reagan control his speechwriters

directly, which could have given him flexibility in the

kinds of messages he wanted to deliver.
Noonan, who arrived as a speechwriter in 1984, got to
see both administrations at work. She believes that the

suggestions from Regan's aides hurt the quality of the

president's message.
in the long run it proved unwise
because it contributed to the
diminution in the grace and
effectiveness of the president's
rhetoric that marked the second
administration 21

Effective public communication, Noonan says, should be the

overriding goal of the president
trust in the speechwriters.
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and this includes placing

.

Noonan says the second-term speechwriting
team had
less control over their speeches and did
not fare

as well in

molding the president's image because of Regan's
insistence
that the "mice" review their work.

Moderates within the

second administration, such as National Security
Adviser
Robert McFarlane and Secretary of State George Shultz,
sided

with the dictates of Regan and criticized the speechwri
ters
for getting directly involved in the creation of policy.

Both believed that the speechwriters should be writing

presidential speeches free of Buchanan's influence.
Instead, Buchanan encouraged his writers to advance policy
and,

simultaneously, promote a more conservative social

agenda.

The concerns expressed by Shultz and McFarlane,

Noonan claims, had no validity, because speechwriters make
the words,

thus separating speechwriting from policy is

impossible
The speechwriting shop became one of the few places

where honest conservative ideas were cultivated, Noonan
says.

"And so speechwriting was,

for some,

the center of

gravity in that administration to the point where ideas and
principles still counted ." 22

Yet despite these principles,

they failed to generate adequate excitement for major
policies.

Reagan's dependence on public communication

should have given Buchanan an impetus for better work in the

speechwriting shop.

"A few years later Shultz told me

presidential speechwriting worked fine until Pat came along
and ruined it because he was such

a

right-winger ."'

3

This

shows that the division between hard-core conservatives and
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the more moderate staff never ended,
despite the fact that

pragmatists had left the White House.

C.

Expectations

The second-term team came in with optimism that
it

could do more for Reagan.

While they had no major event to

boost their work, such as Reagan's recovery from the

assassination attempt provided, they felt good about their
chances with the large re-election victory Reagan had
posted.

Even discounting polls, there was a good feeling

within the administration.
Though it normally takes time and dedication to

develop an agenda, the new staff members searched for
instant results.

The conservative agenda, however, could

not easily go forward without a major issue on which to

complete the possible realignment. "For a couple of years
there was a lot of talk about the

[nation's]

swing to the

right,'' Daniel Yankelovich wrote in the middle of Reagan's

second term.

"It became clear that that was not the case,

though there is

[still]

a

country's conservatism." 24

great deal of emphasis on the
The New York Times had earlier

observed that Reagan had not been blessed with

policy

Other political analysts,

mandate in the 1984 election.
too,

a

such as communications expert Robert

E.

Denton, Jr.,

suggested that Reagan had been re-elected almost exclusively
because of his charm and rhetoric.
correct,

If these arguments are

then Reagan's advisers were mistaken to encourage
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him to pursue an even more conservative
agenda that called
for greater sacrifices from the people.
The political tides, which are under constant
flux,

seemed to have stabilized in the 1980's, allowing
some
people to believe that Reagan was leading the first

realignment since Franklin

D.

Roosevelt's in 1932.

But

there was no major issue on which the administration
could
lead a realignment, despite frequent attempts to find the
r ight

issue.

Buchanan proposed that the administration

begin a war on crime.

Regan disagreed, opting instead for

tax reform.

D.

Results

The unexpected difficulties that Reagan faced during
the second term were symbolized on the day of his second

inauguration when

a

bitter chill descended on Washington.

This day was truly unlike his first inauguration, which had

bright sunshine and unseasonably warm weather.

The cold and

icy day in the nation's capital that forced the scheduled

activities inside was only the beginning of Reagan's
problems.

Poor planning efforts showed up early in the

second term, affecting not only the ability to create
policy, but also the ceremonial responsibilities of the

presidency.

Reagan always wanted to be in

a

comfortable,

bright place that allowed his cheery persona to reflect the

setting and garner him public support.
unable to avoid

a

But Reagan was

commitment to speak at the dark atmosphere

of the Bitburg cemetery where young Nazis had been buried 40
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years earlier.

German Chancellor Helmut Kohl did not

understand the offense that this would commit.
error in judgment angered many Jewish- Americans

Reagan's
,

but

Buchanan, pushing the conservative line, wanted
Reagan to go
on the offensive against the critics of the trip
and stand
up to the Jewish-American leaders.
By never formally

issuing apologies, Buchanan attempted to bring the "real"

Reagan out to the public.
Like Buchanan, Regan took a hard-line stance on

Bitburg to cover for the mistakes the advance unit had made.
The problems caused by Bitburg delayed Regan's planning for

future policy as time elapsed while he answered critics and

smoothed over the problems

.

Bitburg compounded the main

concerns that resulted from the 1984 campaign, which

intentionally focused on values instead of issues.

For his

entire presidency, Reagan only averaged four policy

proposals a year to Congress. 25

Presidents in their second

terms expect to meet more resistance to their policies.

For

the 73 -year-old Reagan, questions abounded as to whether his

skills as a speaker had deteriorated.
as a lame-duck president,

Both Reagan's status

and his advancing age,

contributed to the failures.

Of course,

in part,

Reagan had

effectively countered Mondale's campaign that age mattered
by claiming that he would not take advantage of the

Democrat's youth and inexperience for political gain.
But the two factors that were most important could not
be seen or were obscured by the election results.

First,

Reagan needed suitable assistants to pass policy.

Second,
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the victory did not prove to conservatives
that the

attitudes of Americans were changing.

supplied evidence
warning signal

-

-

But opinion surveys

which could have been heeded as

a

that there existed a renewed trust in the

federal government and support for its entitlement
programs.

Finding a strong issue on which to base the new term was
as

much of a challenge.
in 1983,

Tax reform,

first offered to Congress

was brought back to the bargaining table.

Urban

enterprise zones, the line-item veto, and prayer in school
were all placed on the second administration's agenda.

Employing solely going-public tactics has never been

enough for any president to obtain his agenda, especially
when it contains many objectives that had failed previously.
Even in 1981 there was enough bargaining to get Reagan's

budget passed.

In his second term,

public appeals may only work for

a

Reagan learned that
limited time.

After

relying on pressure from representatives' local constituents
to obtain votes in the 1981 budget proceedings, Reagan's

staff expected him to continue this successful strategy.

By

1985 the public pressure used to pass Reagan's basic

policies back in 1981 no longer existed.

The conservative

agenda allowed people's passion for Reagan's policies to

dissipate even while his popularity remained high.
Conservatives within the administration did not fully

appreciate that Reagan's successes had caused the American
people to become more confident in the federal government.
This unintended effect is clear from separate polls taken in
1981 and 1986.

When Reagan took office, 77 percent of those
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polled said the government created more problems than it
solved.

By 1986, this number had dipped to 62 percent. 26

Similarly, a March 1985 ABC News/ The Washington Post survey

showed that Americans were placing greater trust in the
government.

In the poll,

66 percent of respondents said

spending should not be cut for social programs.
1982,

In February

only 51 percent had agreed with this statement 27

,

though some programs, such as Social Security, always had

received substantial support.
These polls were remarkably different from those of
the early 1980'

s.

Wirthlin had found, in the 1980 election,

that there were "strong feelings that the scope of

government should be reduced." 28

And in 1981, a 59-35

percent margin said the best government is

governs least. 29

a

government that

The new statistics should have told the

administration that the foundation of their conservative
program, which relied on voters to support the concept of

reducing the federal government's role, could not be

achieved without enhanced bargaining.
Buchanan thought that Reagan'

s

continued popularity

could allow the administration to pass its program without
bargaining.

Bargaining, though, would have stripped the

communication director's conservative beliefs of meaning.
"Public discussion requires issues to be stylized in ways
that frequently reduce choices to black-and-white

alternatives and to principles that are difficult to
modify." 30

It also hardens the negotiating positions of

each side when compromise must finally be reached.
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Because he had such

a

good feeling for the president's

future success, Buchanan was more passionate
about enhancing
the conservative agenda despite the evidence
found in the

polls
The Buchanan view - not necessarily
that of the senior staff as a whole is that Reagan should speak out on
controversial topics, taking full
advantage of the presidency to frame
the issues' in favorable terms. 31
'

Buchanan hoped to blame Democrats for the budget deficits,
and he labeled opponents of SDI "those who would leave

America defenseless."
With Baker and other moderates no longer in charge,
Congress may not have been willing to bargain with Reagan
anyway.

There would have been little advantage for the

legislature to do so.

Whether Congress was prepared to

bargain or not, its Democratic members were bolstered by the
polls which could be loosely interpreted as showing

Americans becoming tired with the president's policies.

Gergen explained in

a

As

1985 U.S, News & World Report article,

the man has been extraordinarily
popular while his agenda has been
falling apart in Congress. And the
public is mostly siding with Congress,
not Reagan 32

Reagan's personal popularity helped to "camouflage" how weak
his programs had become, Gergen added.

Even Kevin Phillips,

the conservative author, argued that Reagan was moving too
far to the right too swiftly.

Moderates and liberals in Congress benefitted from the
new attitudes, which eventually allowed the Democratic
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leadership to protect the core programs of
the New Deal and
oppose foreign policy that was too extreme:
Reagan had won his landslide, but
Congress already understood that he had
no particular mandate from the public
as he had in 1980.
Public opinion was
no longer Reagan's monopoly. 33
There were poor poll numbers leading up to the election,
but
not enough to raise concern.
In a 1984 Harris survey, 66

percent of respondents judged Reagan's nuclear arms

reduction

failure.

a

34

In addition,

59 percent said his

efforts to help those hardest hit by the recession were

inadequate
So,

35
.

it is no coincidence that Congress hardened its

resolve just as Democrats were gaining back many of the

House seats that had been lost during Reagan's first term.

And by 1987 there was no longer
majority.

a

Republican Senate

This permitted the 100th Congress to thwart

Reagan by moving to the left, passing laws in areas of fair

housing and welfare reform, enacting bills to aid the
homeless, expanding food-stamp provisions, and enhancing

civil rights at the federal level.

House Speaker Jim

Wright, who had replaced Tip O'Neill, said that the needs of

both the working and lower classes had been deferred too
long by Reagan's agenda.

The Democrats were finally able to

expand entitlement programs, many of which had been cut or
level funded since 1981.

encountered.

This defined the failures Reagan

The second term may have been more successful

if Reagan had focused on real issues rather than values,

which was Buchanan's main area of interest.
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Buchanan, unlike Gergen, never controlled
the Press
Office.
But he did win control of the 36-member
staff

Office of Public Liaison from Rollins.

Rollins believed

that the office could be best used as a political

realignment tool, but Regan thought it would better function
as a place to "get - the-word-out

.

"

Rollins also argued with

Buchanan about how best to sway Congressional votes in
support of the Contras.

The political director,

like

Wirthlin, believed that arms should be twisted in Congress
to get support as opposed to the going-public strategies.

Buchanan preferred to use
a lack of

a

public appeals strategy, showing

dependence on traditional bargaining and his fear

of wasting potential political capital.

Buchanan, though,

was not afraid to pressure Congress:
We don't have to influence the whole
country now. We have to influence 30
or 40 people.
That calls for a
different type of argument. We've
given all the arguments on why we think
the aid is necessary.
Now we've got to
make the argument about what happens if
we don't get it and point out who will
be responsible. 36
.

.

The public liaison office was soon being used as a

promotional tool for support of the Contras rather than as
an office designed to listen to the concerns of interest

groups such as women, minorities, and business executives.
The Office of Public Liaison played a key role in the

budget battle of 1981 in getting Reagan's tax policies
through.

Buchanan's take over of this office, then,

signalled a further rightward shift in not only the

direction of policy, but in discussions with congressional
100

leaders.

The liaison office may have influenced some

independents to vote for Reagan, but it did not make
the
electorate more conservative.
While Reagan's popularity temporarily increased the

number of Republican supporters, there was no comparable

strengthening of the conservative base of his party in the
first term.

Polls showed that the number of Americans

considering themselves conservatives held steady throughout
Reagan's eight years.

Reagan was only rewarded with large

election victories because

a

majority of the swing votes

from conservative Democrats and Independents went to him.
In 1980,

for example, Reagan took 41 percent of the

conservative Democratic vote in the three-way race.

Ford

managed only 35 percent of this vote four years earlier.
Reagan held

a 24

percent margin in independent's voting,

routing Carter 54 percent to 30 percent. 37

Reagan and Buchanan saw realigning voters as a useless

endeavor because it would not improve the short-term success
of the president.
1987,

A Roper survey, taken between May 16-30,

showed that political ideologies were relatively fixed

in the preceding 10 years.

themselves conservative,

In 1977,

41 percent considered

This rose to only 44 percent in

1982 and dipped to 43 percent five years later.

Those

considering themselves liberals in 1977 accounted for 22
percent of the electorate, falling to 19 percent in 1982 and
rising to 23 percent in 1987. 38
Despite the failure to gain long-term stability, in

March 1987, after his 62nd month in office, Reagan's
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approval ratings still remained higher than
those of
Eisenhower, Johnson and Nixon at comparable
times of their
second terms.
But while Reagan's approval ratings continued
to rise nearly two years into his second
term, this did
not

mean that his policy was popular.

These polls did not

adequately indicate Reagan's inability to pass his policy,
or the fact that a moderate agenda had been used to
procure

his earlier successes.
The main problem Buchanan faced was that he had no one

from whom he could draw public support for his beliefs.

Policies such as funding the space-based defense system and
the Contras needed this support.

As Gergen noted,

"The

primary beneficiaries of Reagan's popularity are his fellow
Republicans, far more than his fellow conservatives

."

39

This is in agreement with the attitude change of the

population
Falling back on direct appeals, of course, did not
always work.

Two of Reagan's most cherished goals,

construction of new MX missiles and the advancement of the
Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) program, were initially

defeated by Congress.

Though Reagan practiced it rarely,

a

president may be able to advance his policy without the

popular sentiments of the American people if he is equally
capable of working within
relations.

a

structure of Congressional

The tax reform proposal that simplified tax

codes was remarkably passed through Congress despite no

major support from either the general population or interest
groups.

Reagan's public appeals on the issue fell to deaf
102

ears, making it unsuitable for use as a
momentum builder,
for political gain, or for realignment
purposes.
The Reagan

tax proposal, though, was supported by a 49-29
margin in a
June 1985 Gallup poll, and nearly the same
margin of people

believed it would make the tax system fairer for all.
But
these numbers were far from overwhelming. 40 The concerted
effort of Treasury officials, led by Baker, was what got tax

reform passed.

Treasury bargained with Congressional

leaders such as Sen. Bob Packwood, R-Oregon, to get the

reforms in place, defying those who believed it could not be
done

.

Maintaining the popularity of the president was not as
important to Regan and Buchanan as increasing the range of

policy that could be advanced.

They both felt that the high

approval ratings for the president should allow him to be

a

more influential conservative than Wirthlin's polls
indicated.

Noonan disliked the polling conducted by

Wirthlin because the polls were supposedly responsive to the
state of the country and thus could influence the content of

her writing.

Wirthlin's techniques with regard to audience-

testing specific words, such as his input for State of the

Union addresses, angered Buchanan's speechwri ters

.

"This

isn't writing; this is one small step for focus groups, one
41
giant step for the where' s-the-beef -ization of mankind."

Despite Regan's insistence that polls did not matter, his
staff used them, Noonan says, to re-write speeches and gain

greater control over their content.

Wirthlin did play an

integral role in helping Reagan respond to the American
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people by identifying issues that would resonate
with them.
Buchanan felt that he had to go beyond these
issues,

however,

if he were to accomplish his goals.

The performances of both Regan and Buchanan
reflected

how they worked in opposition to each other.

Neither Regan

nor Buchanan heeded the warnings of their predecessors in

their respective offices.
of Communications,

The politicization of the Office

which exchanged the long-range planning

function for an immediate ideological impact on policy
matters, meant that standing up to Congress would be less

effective.

Gergen later complained that Buchanan used the

office as a tool for Reagan to veer far to the right.

Newsweek reported:

As

"Within the White House, Buchanan seeks

the influence of ideas, not bureaucratic turf,

urging a hard conservative line

."

42

consistently

But Buchanan would

learn that the purity of his ideas would not be as

influential as Gergen'
planning.

s

public pressure and adequate

Buchanan was not an ineffective communications

director, but he was willing to sacrifice long-term planning

and staff cohesiveness for ideology.
Buchanan'

s

vision could more easily impact foreign

policy because he faced little obstruction from Congress or
the domestic policy council.

"Reagan's slam-bam push for

contra aid was widely regarded in the capital as

victory for the tenacious Buchanan ." 43

a

personal

Buchanan's basic

problem in his position was his refusal to sacrifice his
views for the greater good of the presidency and his

aversion to being

a

consensus builder.
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The independent

policy stances he already held were bolstered
by
constituency in the Republican party.
"He has

a

loyal

made of his

office an independent political outpost that
has led to two
years of bitter clashes in the Reagan White
House." 44
These "clashes" did not help the image of

a

unified White

House and affected Regan's ability to control the

conservative direction he envisioned.

Many conservatives criticized Buchanan for failing to
rally Congressional support for $100 million in aid for the
Contras in 1985.

The Republicans, who lost the House battle

222-210, understood that Buchanan's attitude had hurt their
cause.

His op-ed piece in March 1985 that said Democrats

who cast their votes against sending aid to the Contras were

supporting the Soviet Union may have backfired, sealing the
fate of the aid:

Critics say that Buchanan encourages
Reagan's most doctrinaire notions to
the peril of presidential
accomplishment, and that his taste for
strident language and 'demonizing' his
adversaries will undermine the
president's gift for building
consensus 45
.

Furthermore, Buchanan advised the president not to place

sanctions on South Africa.

In a July 22 speech,

he urged

the president to remain firmly anti -Communist by opposing

sanctions that many Americans believed would show support
for the disenfranchised black South Africans.

Perhaps Regan

could have better contained Buchanan's impulses.

Instead,

Regan was rarely seen and he only controlled the most
extreme of Buchanan's speeches.
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As chief of staff, Regan failed to
protect the

president from the too outspoken and too
confrontational
Buchanan.
Buchanan was allowed to push a hard
line and

change people's perceptions of the president.

Buchanan also

advised Reagan not to extradite John Demjanjuk back
to
Israel even though he was believed to be a former Nazi.
This could have placated some of the bad feelings engendered

by the fiasco at Bitburg.
The conservative social policy, such as placing limits
on abortion and advancing school prayer, hardly got off the

drawing board.

Buchanan endorsed Meese's attempts to put

a

conservative stamp on the Supreme Court and in the federal
judicial system.

By the end of his time at the White House,

Buchanan was trying to use his influence more and more by
writing editorials rather then working within the system.
This is a sign, Noonan says, that he eventually conceded

defeat because his work was going to waste

Buchanan has been lax at administration
and at preserving turf and status for
himself and his employees.
He has been
like an absent-minded professor trying
to teach philosophy in a reform
school 46
.

Even many Reagan supporters believed that Buchanan's policy
advice frequently backfired on the president.

Reagan had no dramatic triumphs between 1984 and 1986,
as continued economic growth and low inflation were

counterbalanced by budget and trade deficits.
The Presidency is no place for semiThe President does best
retirement.
with a small cadre of assistants, with
flexible assignments and
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responsibilities of both act ion- forcing
and program-building nature. 47
The proper decision-making process was
circumvented in the
later Reagan years in order to make sure success
at

important items on the agenda, like aiding the Contras,
were
achieved
The foreign policy arena was where Buchanan finally

embarked on an attempt to leave a conservative impression
after failing to do so on domestic policy.

Buchanan felt

that Reagan could promote the social agenda well enough on

his own.

SDI was to have used strictly defensive space

weapons to protect the United States against attack.

Questions of its cost, which ranged from $15 to $18 billion
over the 1985 to 1989 time-frame 48 and its actual purpose
meant that it had less chance of success in Congress during
the second term,

even though the public indicated they could

support the program.

The Iceland summit with Gorbachev

caused frustration for Reagan's conservative allies, who had

hoped the president would strengthen his stance against the
Soviets and not concede to demands in military reductions.

They were backed up by many Americans who felt that Reagan
had not been tough enough on the Soviets.

Buchanan saw additional strength for the SDI after the
Iceland summit with Gorbachev.

But there was not enough

enthusiasm to convince Congress that it should spend money
on a weapon better suited for an earlier period of the Cold
War.

Congress saw the polls that reflected decreased

support when the cost was taken into account.
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Unfortunately, the arms control
process, like so many of the
Administration's security- related and
domestic initiatives in the early
stages, suffered from the lack of a
disciplined interdepartmental policymaking structure. 49
Meanwhile, the administration focused on passing the
"Star
Wars" space defense program again.

But Buchanan hoped to go

further to the right, advocating strict constructionist
Robert Bork for the Supreme Court, stating his opposition to

sanctions against South Africa, and defending military
support for the Contras.

Congress tried to resist the

administration's attempts at every turn.

Buchanan became

more representative of the administration's goals than
Regan,

the person who was supposed to set the agenda.

Public opinion was divided on supporting the Contras.

Everett Carll Ladd points out that people's foreign policy

opinions are often difficult to measure, especially when

monetary cost is taken into account.

"Contrary to what

seems to be an increasingly popular myth, Americans do not

warm to figures with whom they have deep policy
disagreements." 50

American do not often feel comfortable

with foreign aid because it is difficult to visualize the
results of the spending.

Yet support for helping the

Contras, outside of the likely cost of the plan, did exist.

A poll taken in April 1986 showed

a 58-29

percent margin of

people believed that "the U.S. should aid the rebels in

Nicaragua to prevent Communist influence from spreading to
other countries in Central America." 51

That May, Reagan

still had a 70 percent favorable rating among all voters and
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an 82 percent favorable rating among
young voters, according
to Wirthlin. 52

A large majority are at once reluctant
to see the United States become deeply
engaged in aiding the Contras - and
opposed to our sitting back while a
Soviet-serving regime is consolidated
in Nicaragua. 53
On June 25, despite the fact that Tip O'Neill continued
to

oppose it, a $100 million aid package finally passed the
House,

$70 million of which would be used for military

expenditures.

When people were asked whether the government

should provide $100 million in aid to help topple the

Nicaraguan government, opposition was 62-25 percent. 54
Almost as many people were against Reagan's request for new

military aid. 55

While there may been a lack of

understanding by the public, this became just one in

a line

of many second-term policies that failed to enthuse

passions.

On November 25,

1986,

the diversion of money to

fund the Contras became public.
The revelations from the Iran-Contra affair and those

included in many staff members' tell-all books combined to
collapse many Americans' faith in Reagan's leadership.

Young voters, though, continued to support Reagan in large
numbers.

A CBS News/ The New York Times poll from January

1988 showed that Reagan's job performance was approved by 59

percent of those between 18 and 29 years old.

Approval

ratings declined with successively older age groups.

aged 60 and over only gave him
just

4

a 41

percent approval rating,

percent more than those that disapproved.

109

Those

h

These

ratings, however, may have less to do with
the

administration moving to the right and more to
do with the
possible illegality of their actions. But the
poll numbers
had given Reagan the freedom to move in whatever
direction
he chose,

and he opted to make the Contras a major policy.

In a December 1986 article,

Ladd said low poll numbers

did not necessarily mean that Reagan would suffer further

policy setbacks.

"In general,

Reagan's current approval

ratings are not out of line with those of the first
term." 57

However, the opinions expressed by the American

people would shift in relation to how serious the

allegations about Reagan's knowledge of Iran-Contra became,
Ladd noted.
Ladd is correct that Reagan still could have passed
policy, even with the Iran-Contra affair overshadowing the

remainder of the second term's political agenda.

Reagan's

critics used the illegal operation to, at the minimum,

attack him for not properly supervising his staff.

Regan

says in his memoirs that Buchanan advised him to disclose

everything about Iran-Contra and to tell the American people
why the action was taken.

Buchanan was asked by Regan in December 1986 to
counter the growing Iran-Contra scandal by praising the

administration and defending the core principles that Reagan
had espoused.
envisioned.

But Buchanan again went far beyond what Regan

Never one to fear controversy or the public's

wrath, Buchanan proceeded to construct an attack against

ungrateful Republicans, the liberal press, and Congress for
110

having criticized Oliver North's actions.

The piece,

published in The Washington Post, also called
North a hero
and an American patriot.
Regan had lost
control of the

communications director.

"Regan called Buchanan on the

carpet on the day the column was published, but
there was
nothing the chief of staff could do to discipline him." 58
Finally, Buchanan decided he would submit his resignation
in

March 1987, possibly frustrated that he had failed to impact
the terms of debate.

But he had done more than enough to

disrupt Regan's work.
In the wake of the Iran-Contra scandal and his

deteriorating relationship with the Washington-based news
corps,
Regan'

Regan was asked to leave his post at the White House.
s

departure and the subsequent appointment of Howard

Baker as the new chief of staff ushered in

Reagan's presidency.

a

new era for

Howard Baker had worked hard with the

administration to pass Reagan's first budget in 1981.
appointment was even supported by Gergen in U.S. News

World Report

His
&

.

When his legislative goals failed, Reagan refused to
use the presidency in a more constructive way.

Regan said

that the president should have issued more vetoes to protect

himself from Congressional policies with which he disagreed.

Reagan could have also used the administrative vehicle of
executive orders to bypass some Congressional resistance.
Yet he issued only 381 executive orders, amounting to an

average of less than 50 per year. 59

This low total for a

modern president, Light says, might mean that Reagan feared
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,

jeopardizing his popularity with the electorate,
failing to issue more orders, Reagan compounded

But in
his staff's

problems and left the conservative revolution
incomplete.
The problems encountered in the second term
may

have

dampened the public's enthusiasm for the president
and his
political agenda, but Americans were generally pleased
with
Reagan when he left office.
In a poll conducted jointly

by

ABC News and The Washington Post on Nov.
Day)

8,

1988

(Election

about 43 percent of 23,030 voters said they were

better off economically after Reagan's presidency. Nearly as
many,

38 percent,

said they were as well off, while only 19

percent said they were worse off. 60

These poll results

indicate that Reagan had regained some of the support he
lost due to the Iran-Contra scandal, but it was not enough
to translate into political success.
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CHAPTER VI

EVALUATE THESIS: HOW USEFUL IS THIS
The lessons drawn from the experience
of the Reagan

administration can be applied to all modern
presidents who
depend on external communications. Future
presidents may
not be able to capture the audience of the
American people
like Reagan did because the political institutions
have

probably changed enough to prevent this from happening.
institutional politics of the 1970's and 1980'

been permanent.

In fact,

s

The

have not

"the presidential dominance of

legislation to which we are all now accustomed is of

relatively recent vintage."

1

And it may already be fading.

The president's upper hand on legislation

disintegrated during the second term because of the key
players'

refusal to bargain to pass the conservative

policies and the clouded agenda.

But future presidents may

not be able to adapt public rhetoric as well.

For the short

term at least, the 104th Congress's House Speaker Newt

Gingrich changed the dynamics of the relationship between
Congress and the president and Congress and its
constituents.

For the long term, however, C-SPAN has given

wider coverage to the Congress and its actors, where policy
can be created pending the approval of the president

Public communication in the early 1980'

played

a

large role in the power structure and personal relationships

between the president, the Congress, and the American
public.

With a consistent and well -prepared agenda, the

president's diverse audiences knew exactly what to expect
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s

.

from him, allowing them to work in
unison to achieve the
goals he outlined.
However, because Reagan had previously
left much of his agenda to others and
then limited the

number of real issues focused on in the 1984
campaign, the
turnover in personnel and the new appointees at
the

beginning of the second term created

a

frustrating situation

that would bring on different results and a new
political

direction
Herbert Klein, who can justifiably be considered an
expert on White House communications, believes that the need
for good communication skills should enter the president's

decisions when picking staff members:
If I were a new President appointing
government officials the qualification
of strong communications aptitude would
get top priority.
A cabinet officer
may be a genius in his own field, but
he must communicate leadership to the
bureaucracy and to the public and press
if he is to be fully effective. 2

Buchanan, however, was too brash and outspoken to

communicate with the American people or the bureaucracy.
These characteristics may have been appealing to some fellow
conservatives, but it did not endear him to the people he

needed to persuade
Though promotion of the presidency appears as if it
will remain an integral part of the White House staff's
duties,

future presidents should always be prepared to

return to an older style of governing where bargaining with

Congress is more important to one's eventual success.

political analysts in the 1970'
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and 1980'

Some

claimed that it

was bad for politics when the presidency
was the center of

government as institutionalized pluralism

bargain

-

declined.

-

the power to

Other actors seem to have neutralized

the television advantages usually held by the
chief

executive.

Gingrich frequently scheduled his own news

conferences to be telecast and played

a large role

political discussions of the mid-1990's.

in all

This has offset

the potential problem some critics have found in a

president's promotional tactics.

Maltese claims that there

is a very real threat:

that our ideal of a bold and
deliberative government will be dashed
by timid, self-interested policymakers
who shy away from responsibility for
their own actions and delude themselves
and their constituents with their own
symbolic spectacles.
3

But this would mean that good policy will never be created.

Yet even in Reagan's unsuccessful second term, a major tax

reform plan was passed and the United States' relationship
with the Soviet Union improved.
Had Reagan's second-term staff opted to make use of

bargaining tools to pass controversial policy, rather than
using the more familiar going-public tactics, there would
have been a greater chance of passing an agenda with

broad-based conservative imprint.

Instead,

a

more

the staff needed

the American people, who had clearly not been realigned in
1980 or 1984, once again put pressure on Congress.
It

is not surprising that the second term was less

successful

.

Buchanan and Regan both should have expected

this to happen, even in the face of good poll numbers.
118

But

had they worked together, rather than against
each other's
goals, Reagan might have witnessed more
successes.
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CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

Placing all the blame for the second-term
failures on
the actions of the Office of Communications
under Patrick

Buchanan may be unfair because second terms tend to
be less
successful anyway.
It is remarkable, however, that a
president who was still very popular could do so little in
his second term.

This happened because the role expectation

placed on Reagan was transformed after the first four years
of his presidency.

No longer was he needed to cure the

economic morass or make Americans feel good about
themselves.

That had been accomplished.

people could take

a

The American

closer look at his policies.

Despite other factors that helped to impair the second
term,

the failure to generate adequate public support for a

conservative agenda and the belief that "letting Reagan be
Reagan" would make his policies more viable were the major

reasons the conservative revolution was never completed.

Buchanan's pursuit of an overly conservative agenda
separated Americans' affection for Reagan the father figure
from Reagan the ideological conservative.

people could accept the Reagan agenda

-

The American

including his

defense program, social positions, and economic views

-

so

long as they were not asked to give up programs they

expected and demanded.
Buchanan may have been skilled enough to lead the
office, but he compromised the external communications

strategy of the first administration.
121

There was a concerted

.

effort to make Reagan's communications more
ideological and
to focus on specific rather than general
policies, which

undermined the potential for success.
journalist at Th e New York Times

,

Hedrick Smith, the

criticizes Reagan for

ceding so much power to Regan and Buchanan.

"The more any

president is preoccupied with public relations and ceremony,
the more power over the substance of policy he must turn

over to subordinates."

1

This left Reagan vulnerable to the

rightward shift demanded by his communications director and
the advocates in the administration who insisted his public

appeals alone would overcome

a

less-than-enthusiastic

Congress

Administration officials were jubilant over their

victory in the 1984 presidential election and seemed certain
anything could be accomplished.

But the internal turmoil

between the chief of staff and the Office of Communications,
caused by the conservative agenda, ruined the efforts of

drafting quality speeches, maintaining
the day,

and the policymaking process.

a

consistent line of
The old adage that

one who lives by the sword also dies by the sword applies to
the Reagan administration.

Reagan'

s

laid-back and removed management style did

not cost him politically during the first term when unity
was a high priority and policy was accomplished.

there was really

a

Whether

decline in Reagan's abilities, his

detachment manifested itself much more severely in the
second term.

It became well

publicized during the second

term as former administration officials began to write
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books

And the eventual loss of control over
certain

members of his staff, including Buchanan and
those involved
in the Iran-Contra scandal,

will remain a haunting reminder

of Reagan's indifference to his leadership role.

With or

without the scandals, however, Reagan would not likely
have
been able to pass key elements of the conservative agenda
without a greater emphasis on bargaining.

With the support of the American people, though,

Reagan believed that he could turn to foreign policy when
Congress resisted his agenda.

Critics correctly blame his

laid-back attitude for the illegal actions that were pursued
in his name, but it was his popularity that gave these

subordinates the opportunity to pursue such

a policy.

Because Reagan often did not convey information to his
staff members, establish the goals for the administration,
or assign the tasks of governing, whomever Reagan appointed
as the chief of staff would have an influential role in

policymaking and setting the agenda.

But Reagan rarely

backed up Regan's work, permitting the chief of staff and

Buchanan to slug it out on the issues.
Finally, by the middle of the second term, the

institutional politics had changed.

Reagan was unable to

influence the legislators like he had in 1981 despite his

continuing mastery over the American people.

Buchanan and

Regan were both at fault for not recognizing this.
Yet the long-term reminder of the Reagan presidency

has actually been the yearly deficits rung up under

Stockman's rosy- scenario budget forecasts.
123

One in five

.

Americans cited the budget deficit as the
most disappointing
outcome of Reagan's performance as president. 2
Reagan left
a $2,683 trillion national debt, nearly
three times

as large

as when he entered office:

Against this background, Reagan's
acclaimed success and personal
popularity as President posed something
of a political mystery.
His promises
were not delivered.
His proposals were
shown not to work. His objectives were
not achieved.
His policies remained
unpopular
3

The explanation, though, is relatively simple.

Reagan did

wonderful job selling his proposals to the American people,
who did not immediately perceive his policies as failures.

Only when a more conservative direction was sought, using

many of the same tactics, did people recognize the
deficiencies in the policy.

The gap between rhetoric and

the actual policy had narrowed considerably.
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